Anadolu Efes still has beer written on the door. But in the first quarter of 2026, the heavy crate was carried by Coca-Cola İçecek. The segment tables in the 1Q2026 interim activity report say this without softening it: the beer group posted -761 million TL of EBITDA; CCI produced 9.342 billion TL of EBITDA.
Then accounting opens a second door. In the official financial statements, consolidated profit for the period is 4.525 billion TL. Of that, 2.515 billion TL belongs to non-controlling interests and 2.010 billion TL to the parent. The AEFES investor’s question is therefore not only how many hectoliters were sold; it is how much of the load carried by CCI passes through to the parent stake and the cash box.
| Segment | EBITDA |
|---|---|
| Beer Group | TRY -0.761bn |
| CCI | TRY 9.342bn |
| Other and eliminations | TRY -0.067bn |
| Consolidated | TRY 8.514bn |
The company’s physical body is still large. The 31 March 2026 interim activity report describes a group operating with 10 breweries, two malt plants, one hop processing facility, 36 bottling plants on the CCI side, and three fruit juice concentrate plants at Anadolu Etap. The same source shows a beer and soft drink presence across 52 countries, 15,885 employees, and nearly 70 export markets. On the ownership side, AG Anadolu Grubu Holding owns 43.05%, AB InBev Harmony 24.00%, and free float plus other shares 32.95%.
But how this scale flows to the investor is not simple. AEFES owns roughly 50.3% of CCI, yet fully consolidates CCI because of the shareholders’ agreement. In the revenue and EBITDA table, all of CCI appears; in parent net income, half-ownership speaks. If this distinction is ignored, AEFES can be read as cheaper, cleaner, or stronger than it is.
| Amount | Reading | |
|---|---|---|
| Consolidated net profit | TRY 4.5bn | The visible income-statement profit |
| Non-controlling interests | TRY 2.5bn | 55.6% of consolidated profit |
| Parent shareholders | TRY 2.0bn | Profit left for AEFES shareholders |
| Earnings per share | TRY 0.3394 | Financial statement Note 23 |
1Q2026 consolidated volume rose 5.3% to 25.6 million hectoliters. Consolidated net sales revenue was 62.425 billion TL, and EBITDA was 8.514 billion TL. At first glance, this is a good beverage quarter.
The beer page does not say the same thing. Beer group volume fell 9.6% to 2.1 million hectoliters. Türkiye beer volume contracted 20.2%. Management explains the decline with Ramadan, a number of rainy days above seasonal norms, weaker purchasing power, saving behavior, and the halt of old product shipments at the end of March during the Efes Ailesi renewal. Some of these may be temporary. But if a set described as temporary cuts Türkiye beer volume by one-fifth in a single quarter, the brand’s defensiveness should not be romanticized.
CCI opened a very different ledger. Volume rose 6.9% to 413.9 million unit cases; sales revenue was 52.369 billion TL, EBITDA was 9.342 billion TL, and CCI parent net income was 5.237 billion TL. Türkiye grew 1.4% despite a high base; Central Asia was again described as the main engine. CCI is a good business. For the AEFES investor, the issue is not whether CCI is good; it is how much of that good business is priced into AEFES shares.
TAS 29 is not fog in this table, but a warning light. Under CMB regulation, 1Q2026 statements are presented with inflation accounting. The same 1Q2026 interim activity report also provides an unaudited bridge excluding TAS 29 for ease of analysis: on that bridge, the consolidated net result is -210 million TL. The official table does not need to be rejected; but falling in love with a single profit line is also wrong. In the KAP income statement, the 1Q2026 net monetary position gain is 6.504 billion TL; this amount is more than three times parent net income.
Cash does not yet declare victory either. According to the 1Q2026 interim activity report’s free cash flow bridge, 1Q2026 free cash flow was -7.290 billion TL. This is a serious improvement from last year’s -22.025 billion TL; but it is still money leaving the box. Working capital consumed 6.821 billion TL. In the same quarter, CCI generated 462 million TL of positive free cash flow, while the beer group remained at -6.919 billion TL.
The balance sheet is therefore two-faced. In management’s table, total consolidated debt is 96.605 billion TL, cash and cash equivalents are 32.481 billion TL, and net debt is 64.124 billion TL. Consolidated Net Debt/EBITDA looks comfortable at 1.3x. In the beer group, the same ratio is 4.6x. This is not a crisis wall; but without beer recovery, it is not leverage to be ignored either.
Russia is the locked cellar of the balance sheet. The financial statements and 1Q2026 interim activity report say the Russia beer operation has been deconsolidated as of 1 January 2025 and is carried as a 56.6 billion TL financial investment as of 31 March 2026. Russia’s share of 1Q2026 consolidated revenue is 0%, and its share of total assets is 13%. The asset is large; the revenue door is shut.
Counting this line as zero would be hasty. Counting it at full value would be investor innocence. Value changes will now be tracked not in the income statement, but in other comprehensive income. In other words, if Russia deteriorates, it may not immediately pierce headline profit; but glass breaks in equity.
| Amount | Why it matters | |
|---|---|---|
| Net debt | TRY 64.1bn | Consolidated net debt in management bridge |
| Beer Group Net Debt/EBITDA | 4.6x | Harder beer leverage behind the consolidated 1.3x ratio |
| Russia financial investment | TRY 56.6bn | No revenue contribution, 13% of total assets |
| Total guarantees, pledges and mortgages | TRY 18.7bn | Other guarantees/equity ratio is 0.0% |
| Sales to Migros Group | TRY 2.3bn | Related-party scale should be monitored |
The risk ledger is not only Russia. The financial statement notes show total guarantees, pledges, and mortgages given at 18.743 billion TL, and the ratio of other GPMs given to equity at 0.0%. That is a good boundary. The same source lists headings such as 107 million TL of possible compensation claims against beer operations, 60.8 million TL of commercial litigation for CCI and its Türkiye subsidiaries, and a 120.7 million TL possible tax liability in Pakistan. These are not large enough to topple the company; they are counters showing geography is not free.
Related parties must also be read. The financial statement notes show 2.320 billion TL of sales revenue to Migros Group companies in 1Q2026, 475 million TL of services and commercial goods purchases from AB InBev Group companies, and 4.526 billion TL of other payables to AB InBev Group companies. These items are not automatic red flags. But in a structure like AEFES, with two strategic shareholders and a half-owned asset like CCI, related parties are not decoration; they are part of ownership analysis.
On the management test, the picture is mixed but honest. In 1Q2026, management accepts a start that was “challenging beyond expectations” and says Türkiye beer performance fell short of beginning-of-year expectations. Against that, CCI management says it established a disciplined balance between affordability and value creation, and reached the highest first quarter of the last ten years in net sales revenue per unit case excluding inflation accounting.
Valuation must be read through two separate doors. The first is classic multiple discipline. According to 18 May 2026 market data, AEFES has a market value of 115.3 billion TL. That is 0.97 times the 119.3 billion TL of parent equity. If 1Q2026 parent net income is annualized, market value/earnings is roughly 14.4x. When non-controlling interests and net debt are added and 1Q2026 EBITDA is annualized, NCI-adjusted enterprise value/EBITDA is roughly 8.7x. So the stock is not free; but for a quality beverage platform, it is not expensive either.
The second door suits AEFES better: the economic CCI stake and the option bridge. In 1Q2026, CCI’s parent net income was 5.237 billion TL. AEFES’s roughly 50.3% economic stake corresponds to 2.63 billion TL of that. Annualized from this single quarter, that equals 10.5 billion TL. The current market value assigns this CCI share a multiple of roughly 10.9x. Then what remains is beer recovery, Anadolu Etap, the 56.6 billion TL Russia financial investment, and the debt risk inside the whole structure.
I am not leaning on today’s CCOLA market value here; because this report is limited to AEFES financial statements and AEFES market data, it is more honest to calculate the threshold from the profit share that emerges from AEFES’s own file. If you multiply the CCI profit share by 8x, 31.0 billion TL remains from market value for beer, Anadolu Etap, Russia, and holding risks. If you multiply it by 10x, only 10.0 billion TL remains. If you multiply it by 12x, market value almost pays only for the CCI profit share; beer and Russia are pushed below zero.
When Russia is put on the same table, the picture hardens. If the 56.6 billion TL Russia financial investment is accepted as zero, AEFES cheapness depends on CCI and beer recovery. If Russia carries only one-quarter of its value, at a 10x CCI multiple the room left for beer and other assets turns negative. This sensitivity explains why the cheapness judgment is not a clean gift, but a conditional ownership wager.
| Calculation | Reading | |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 115.3bn | Based on TRY 19.48 share price |
| Market value / parent equity | 0.97x | Slightly below book value |
| Market value / annualized 1Q parent profit | 14.4x | A seasonal Q1 stress test, not a forecast |
| NCI-adjusted EV / annualized 1Q EBITDA | 8.7x | A more honest multiple after adding minorities |
| AEFES annualized CCI profit share | About TRY 10.5bn | Roughly 50.3% economic share of CCI parent profit |
| Value of CCI profit share | Russia value | Residual for beer/Anadolu Etap/holding risks | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CCI profit share at 8x | TRY 84.3bn | 0 | TRY 31.0bn |
| CCI profit share at 10x | TRY 105.4bn | 0 | TRY 10.0bn |
| CCI profit share at 12x | TRY 126.4bn | 0 | TRY -11.1bn |
| CCI 10x + 25% Russia | TRY 105.4bn | TRY 14.1bn | TRY -4.2bn |
| CCI 10x + 50% Russia | TRY 105.4bn | TRY 28.3bn | TRY -18.3bn |
The upside path is concrete. If Türkiye beer volume recovers after the effects of Ramadan, rain, and product transition fade, if beer EBITDA turns positive again during the season, if CCI preserves the volume and margin discipline of 1Q, and if working capital releases and free cash flow turns positive, today’s price will look too stingy. The market would then have to pay not only for a stock below book value, but also for a regional beverage platform and a Russia option.
The downside is just as real. If the Türkiye beer consumer cannot carry the price, discounts and cost pressure eat gross profit. If geopolitical risks, tax headings, or the high base pull CCI margins down, the sound of the consolidated engine changes. If Russia sees a sharper value loss or a harsher control language, the thing called an “option” becomes an equity wound. Most importantly: if consolidated profit grows while parent net income and free cash flow remain weak, the investor will have paid for a machine that sends too little to them.
The counterargument is strong. The first quarter is the weak season of the year for beverage companies. The contraction on the beer side has explainable causes such as calendar, weather, and portfolio renewal. CCI is not an ordinary side business; with Central Asia and Türkiye, it is a real regional growth machine. While the stock trades below parent equity, the market is not giving too much credit to beer recovery or to the full Russia asset. Therefore, even though the risk list is long, the price still leaves a defensible margin of safety.
Verdict: Cheap.
This is not clean cheapness; it is dirty and conditional cheapness. Buying AEFES is not nostalgia for the Efes brand; it is accepting that CCI’s carried crate, the beer season, and the locked Russian cellar can meet inside the same share at the right price.