At AGHOL, profit does not enter the income statement in one piece. It passes through a Migros shelf, a CCI truck, a beer warehouse, an automotive workshop, and a few smaller rooms; then the doors of minority interests, TAS 29, debt, and family control open. In the first quarter of 2026, consolidated net profit was 6.2 billion TL. The portion left to AGHOL shareholders was 1.8 billion TL.
So the first question is not “did the holding grow?” The first question is ownership of profit. The company generated 184.9 billion TL in sales, lifted EBITDA to 14.2 billion TL, and reduced net debt/EBITDA from 1.6x to 1.2x year over year. These are true. In the same table, operating profit is minus 173 million TL, the net monetary position gain is 17.0 billion TL, and non-controlling interests take 4.36 billion TL of profit.
Today’s 34.04 TL share price and 82.9 billion TL market value equal 0.66 times the 126.5 billion TL equity attributable to the parent. That is not a small discount to be passed over with an ordinary “holding discount” sentence. But it is not free money either: the investor is not buying the cashbox, but the chair left after the cashbox.
| Amount | Reading | |
|---|---|---|
| Operating profit/(loss) | TRY -0.17bn | The operating-profit line was negative despite sales and EBITDA growth. |
| Net monetary position gain | TRY 17.0bn | The main accounting item carrying pre-tax profit. |
| Pre-tax profit | TRY 10.0bn | Without the monetary gain, the same picture would look much weaker. |
| Consolidated net income | TRY 6.2bn | Total profit in the income statement. |
| Parent-company share | TRY 1.8bn | Profit left for AGHOL shareholders. |
AGHOL’s economic machine, in its cleanest form, is this: retail turns volume into cash, soft drinks carry margin, beer carries seasonality and geopolitical weight, automotive carries cycle and integration risk, while agriculture/energy/industry stands as a small but leveraged side room. In 1Q26, retail generated 109.2 billion TL in sales, and soft drinks 52.4 billion TL. Beer fell to 9.4 billion TL in sales; volume contracted 9.6%. Automotive declined with 14.8 billion TL in sales. Agriculture/energy/industry rose to 1.7 billion TL but posted a 314 million TL net loss.
The two engines carrying this table are clear: CCI and Migros. In soft drinks, sales volume rose to 414 million unit cases; Kazakhstan grew 11%, Uzbekistan 40.7%. EBITDA was 9.3 billion TL, with a 17.8% margin. Migros reached 3,812 stores with 51 new openings; online sales excluding alcohol and tobacco reached a 23.5% share; EBITDA was 5.3 billion TL. Without these two businesses, the holding’s “resilient growth” sentence would hang in the air.
On the beer side, the story is harsher. Turkey beer volume contracted 20.2%; management explains this with the near-doubling of rainy days, Ramadan, weak consumption, and distributor stock optimization. These are not excuses, but the seasonal truth of the business. For the investor, however, the result is plain: beer EBITDA is negative, free cash flow is minus 6.9 billion TL, and net debt/EBITDA is 4.7x.
In automotive, the invoice for acquired growth is still being read. Anadolu Isuzu’s Samauto move contributed to revenue growth, but segment EBITDA fell 70% to 151 million TL; the segment posted a 250 million TL net loss. Management expects recovery through the rest of the year from the 4x2 pick-up, truck volume, and Uzbekistan efficiency. That sentence must be watched; right now it is not evidence, but a delivery date.
Where management is right but incomplete is debt. Consolidated net debt fell from 110.5 billion TL in 1Q25 to 92.7 billion TL; that is good. But it rose from 81.6 billion TL at year-end 2025 to 92.7 billion TL in 1Q26; that is the seasonal cash face of the business. Consolidated 1.2x leverage looks calm. When beer is at 4.7x, automotive at 12.0x, and agriculture/energy/industry at 7.0x, the average alone is not a sufficient compass.
The cash test gives the same warning. Consolidated cash flow from operations was 1.8 billion TL; net profit for the period was 6.2 billion TL. Cash outflow for purchases of property, plant, equipment and intangible assets was 6.7 billion TL. The simple post-cash picture is minus 4.9 billion TL. CCI’s 462 million TL and Migros’s 1.2 billion TL free cash flow soften the beer side’s minus 6.9 billion TL for now; they do not erase it.
None of this makes AGHOL a bad company. On the contrary, the cheapness argument here only becomes meaningful once the ugly accounting and ownership reality are accepted. Family control is clear: AG Sınai is the main block with 48.65%; Azimut Portföy SKY private fund holds 7.04%; B group registered shares carry the privilege to nominate 6 board members. AGHOL sells management stability; at the same time, it can make the holding discount permanent.
There is no major red flag on the related-party side, but the line items should be watched. Trade receivables from related parties were 258 million TL, trade payables to related parties 122 million TL; balances are unsecured and interest-free. Expenses with Anadolu Efes Sports Club were 555 million TL. These are small relative to holding scale, but worth noting for the public investor: AGHOL is not only a balance sheet, but an ecosystem.
The heavier risks sit behind the balance sheet. The group reports 41.5 billion TL in guarantees, pledges, and mortgages. Other GPMs given stand low at 0.1% of equity, but there is remaining project finance support of 66.1 million dollars for GUE’s 87 MW hydroelectric power plant in Georgia and guarantees falling to AGHOL’s share for Aslancık loans. The net foreign currency liability position, even after derivatives, is 17.1 billion TL; a 10% currency move has a 1.68 billion TL profit/loss effect.
Then there is the Russia shadow. JSC AB InBev Efes is no longer consolidated and is now carried as a financial asset; its value as of 31 March 2026 was 56.6 billion TL. Beside it sits a 4.3 billion TL Colendi asset. These two items may support the cheapness bridge, but unless their voice is heard directly in cash flow, their weight in the book and their weight in the investor’s pocket are not the same.
That is why valuation must be done through two doors. The first door is simple but strong: the parent book. AGHOL’s market value is 82.9 billion TL; equity attributable to the parent is 126.5 billion TL. The market gives this equity 0.66x. A still-discounted value such as 0.8x would mean 101.2 billion TL; that implies roughly 22% upside versus the current market value. A harsher punishment such as 0.6x would mean 75.9 billion TL; the downside test is about 9%.
| Calculation | Reading | |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 82.9bn | Based on a TRY 34.04 share price. |
| Parent-company equity | TRY 126.5bn | Market value is 0.66x this amount. |
| 0.8x parent-company book | TRY 101.2bn | Roughly 22% upside versus current market value. |
| 0.6x parent-company book | TRY 75.9bn | Roughly 9% downside stress test. |
| Annualized 1Q parent-company profit | TRY 7.4bn | About 11.2x at the current market value; the cheapness is more in the book discount than in earnings multiple. |
| Holding-level net debt | TRY 3.16bn | Holding-level debt is much smaller than the consolidated debt picture. |
The second door is a harder holding test: count the parts not with outside market values, but only with the sources inside this report. For CCI, annualize 1Q EBITDA and apply a heavy multiple such as 5x, deduct segment net debt, and take AGHOL’s 21.64% ultimate stake. For Migros, do the same at 4x and apply the 50% stake. Read JSC AB InBev Efes and Colendi not as full consolidated financial investment amounts, but through the 43.05% parent-share look-through along the Anadolu Efes line; then apply an additional 50% discount. Assign zero value to beer operations, automotive, agriculture/energy/industry, and the other rooms in this stress test. Deduct holding net debt.
| Stress assumption | Value attributable to AGHOL | |
|---|---|---|
| CCI | Annualized 1Q EBITDA; 5x EBITDA; TRY 26.2bn net debt deducted; 21.64% stake applied. | TRY 34.8bn |
| Migros | Annualized 1Q EBITDA; 4x EBITDA; TRY 7.6bn net debt deducted; 50% stake applied. | TRY 38.6bn |
| JSC AB InBev Efes + Colendi | TRY 60.9bn of financial assets is first read through the 43.05% parent-share look-through along the Anadolu Efes line, then cut by a 50% discount. | TRY 13.1bn |
| Beer operations, automotive, agriculture/energy/industry, other | No positive value assigned in the stress test. | TRY 0.0bn |
| Holding-level net debt | Holding debt and cash from the activity report are used. | TRY -3.2bn |
| Stress SOTP | Only locally sourced inputs, ultimate ownership and a heavy discount are used. | TRY 83.3bn |
This ruthless calculation comes to 83.3 billion TL; only slightly above the 82.9 billion TL market value. It is not a comfortable margin of safety in the old sense, but the sentence that “even if every bad room is written at zero, it does not fall below market value.” In a more balanced but still discounted case, using 6x for CCI, 5x for Migros, and the same 43.05% look-through on financial assets with a 25% discount, the table rises to roughly 108.5 billion TL. This is not a target price. It is a pressure test showing how harshly the market is punishing the company today, and that the margin of safety now depends less on the parts calculation than on the book discount and the durability of CCI/Migros.
The earnings multiple alone does not give the same courage. Multiplying parent net profit by four gives 7.4 billion TL in annualized profit; the current market value is 11.2 times that. Annualized parent return on equity is only 5.8%. What makes AGHOL cheap is not the headline earnings multiple; it is the 34.5-point discount the market applies to the parent book, the fact that the ownership-adjusted stress SOTP does not fall below market value, and holding-level net debt appearing manageable at 3.16 billion TL.
The anti-thesis is fair: perhaps the market is right. Perhaps the 0.66x book multiple is the normal price of low parent ROE, minority leakage, TAS 29-driven profit quality, negative quarterly free cash flow, and a family-controlled structure. If seasonal cash does not recover in the second quarter, if beer does not loosen its leverage, if investments remain heavy while CCI margin normalizes, the cheapness side of this report weakens.
But today’s price seems to have piled all these risks too far onto one side. Because the portfolio’s two best engines, CCI and Migros, are still growing; holding-level debt is small; consolidated debt has declined year over year; and the ownership-adjusted stress SOTP remains near market value even when the bad rooms are written at zero. This discount may be the justified punishment of a flawed structure. But right now, the punishment is larger than the flaw.
Verdict: Cheap.
AGHOL is not for the investor who wants the clear profit of a single business. This stock is for the investor who knows how to wait their turn at a crowded table, but believes that turn is being sold too cheaply today relative to book value and stress-counted parts. To own it means taking the strength of the Migros cash register and the CCI route, while recounting every quarter how many doors profit must pass through before it reaches the AGHOL chair.