The factory in Yalova is not empty. AKSA closed the first quarter of 2026, in management's words, with capacity utilization "around 90%"; exports accounted for 66% of group revenue. The same report describes the company as a large acrylic fiber producer with 355 thousand tons/year of capacity operating under a single roof. This is not just a chemical stock on a screen; it is a real industrial body working across acrylic fiber, tow, tops, technical yarn, carbon and composites.
But there is another sound in the income statement, almost as loud as the loom. Operating profit is 731 million TL. Profit before tax is 1.168 billion TL. Net monetary position gain is 1.142 billion TL. In other words, the headline profit of the first quarter comes not only from the production line, but also through the monetary gate of TAS 29.
So the investment question is not a simple "has acrylic fiber recovered?" question. The question is this: is AKSA, to which the market assigns a value of 41.26 billion TL, cheap enough as the sum of a heavily utilized factory, the raw-material spread, the intra-group export channel and the promise of advanced materials?
The company's physical identity is strong. According to the 1Q2026 interim activity report, Aksa was founded in 1968 and began production at its Yalova facilities in 1971. It operates under Akkok Holding; in the shareholder structure, Akkok Holding owns 39.95%, Emniyet Ticaret 25.19%, and other shareholders 34.86%. The free float is 31.51%. This control structure is not a problem by itself, but at AKSA, related parties are not decoration; they are part of the business model.
Financial statement Note 20 shows this clearly. In 1Q2026, sales to related parties were 6.47 billion TL. Of this, 6.21 billion TL appears through Ak-Pa; the note says sales made to Ak-Pa consist of export-registered sales made for unrelated third parties. The Ak-Pa trade receivable is 3.05 billion TL, and export loans used through Ak-Pa are 3.45 billion TL. This is not an automatic red flag; but when reading AKSA, the investor must also read the group corridor behind the phrase "exporting industrial company."
The main engine of the machine is still fiber. In the 1Q2026 segment note, Fibers generated 7.77 billion TL in external revenue and 1.54 billion TL in adjusted EBITDA. But advanced materials are no longer merely a presentation word: in the same quarter, they posted 2.23 billion TL in external revenue and 555 million TL in adjusted EBITDA. The 1Q2026 interim activity report discusses commercial shipments from Acrybella, Armora, Mithra and the technical yarn facility in technical fibers; on the Aksa Carbon side, it describes contracted business volume linked to defense and wind energy.
There is a boundary to this good news. Advanced materials still do not free AKSA from the raw-material reality. For the main raw material ACN, the company says it had no procurement problem in the first quarter and that prices moved in a balanced 1,050-1,150 $/ton range. The same paragraph adds that, because of the Middle East war and commodity prices, ACN is likely to complete the rest of the year in the 1,500-1,800 $/ton range. This is the kill switch of profit.
| Source data | Investor read | |
|---|---|---|
| 1Q26 capacity utilization | Around 90% | Real demand and scale started strongly |
| 2026 capacity guidance | 85% +/- 5 | Management is not extrapolating the first-quarter pace to the whole year |
| 1Q26 ACN price | 1,050-1,150 USD/ton | No procurement problem in the first quarter |
| Possible year-end ACN band | 1,500-1,800 USD/ton | The capital-loss path starts here |
| Export share | 66% | FX revenue helps, but currency and feedstock risk remain |
The management test is two-sided here. The first-quarter delivery is good: around 90% capacity, 66% export share, 80% domestic market share with the effect of anti-dumping, and a 17.6% EBITDA margin. The 2026 expectation is more measured: 85% +/-5 capacity utilization, 1 billion US dollars in revenue, 15-18% EBITDA margin and 65 million US dollars of investment. Management also says part of demand was pulled forward because of increases in raw-material and commodity prices. That sentence matters, because it prevents us from treating all the speed we saw in the first quarter as the natural rhythm of the year.
Profit quality demands even more attention. The financial statements are prepared under high-inflation accounting. There is no need to reject this method; this is the correct public statement. But if the investor treats the monetary position gain as if it were operating profit, the courage is being shown in the wrong place.
| Amount | Read | |
|---|---|---|
| Operating profit | 731 million TL | Accounting profit coming from the production line |
| Net finance expense | -726 million TL | Net finance income and expense |
| Net monetary position gain | 1.14 billion TL | The TMS 29 line almost equal to pre-tax profit |
| Pre-tax profit | 1.17 billion TL | Total before the headline net profit |
| Parent net income | 676 million TL | Quarterly profit attributable to AKSA shareholders |
The cash side is better than the headline. Cash flow from operating activities is 3.71 billion TL; consolidated profit for the period is 618 million TL. Yet an important part of this cash comes from working-capital release: the adjustment for decrease in inventories is 1.43 billion TL, and the adjustment for decrease in trade receivables is 886 million TL. This is good quarterly cash, but not a recurring cash margin to be annualized blindly.
For the same reason, the balance sheet is comfortable but not innocent. Cash and cash equivalents are 9.72 billion TL. Total financial debt is 28.97 billion TL. Short-term financial debt is 19.42 billion TL. After deducting cash and financial investments, net financial debt is approximately 19.04 billion TL. The leverage ratios in the 1Q2026 interim activity report show net financial debt/EBITDA falling from 3.66x on 31 December 2025 to 2.54x on 31 March 2026; that is positive. But the short-term burden is not a footnote to be ignored while the ACN price is rising.
| Amount | Why it matters | |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | 9.72 billion TL | First buffer against the debt wall |
| Total financial debt | 28.97 billion TL | Total borrowings in Note 4 |
| Short-term financial debt | 19.42 billion TL | Forces refinancing discipline |
| Net financial debt | 19.04 billion TL | Calculated burden after cash and financial investments |
| Guarantees and letter-of-credit commitments | 9.17 billion TL | Commitment load in financial statement Note 11 |
| Sales to related parties | 6.47 billion TL | Export channel and intragroup economics must be analyzed |
The guarantees and commitments side also requires proportion. In financial statement Note 11, guarantees given are 4.77 billion TL and letter of credit commitments are 4.40 billion TL; the total is 9.17 billion TL. The same note shows guarantees received of 6.04 billion TL. This table is not a crisis document. It says something more specific: as AKSA's commercial volume grows, the reader must look not only at the EBITDA margin, but also at debt, guarantees, letters of credit and intra-group receivable channels.
Valuation should be read through two doors. The first is the classic multiple door. According to market data dated 18 May 2026, the share price is 10.62 TL and the market value is 41.26 billion TL. This price means 1.23x against equity attributable to the parent, and 15.25x against annualized 1Q2026 parent-company profit. In a quarter where profit was enlarged by the monetary position, a 15x multiple does not shout "cheap."
The second door is the company's own 2026 guidance. Management expects 1 billion US dollars in revenue and a 15-18% EBITDA margin. Using the 44.3841 TL closing exchange rate in the period report, this gives an annual EBITDA field of roughly 6.66-7.99 billion TL. The approximately 60.30 billion TL enterprise value calculated with net financial debt equals 7.55x-9.06x EBITDA against this expectation. This is not an expensive dream multiple; but it is not a deeply discounted panic price either.
| Calculation | Read | |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | 41.26 billion TL | Based on a 10.62 TL share price |
| Market value / parent equity | 1.23x | A meaningful but not excessive premium to book |
| Market value / annualized 1Q parent profit | 15.25x | Not proof of cheapness by itself because of the monetary-profit effect |
| Enterprise value / annualized 1Q EBITDA | 8.03x | Reasonable industrial multiple if the quarterly pace holds |
| Enterprise value / 2026 management EBITDA guidance | 7.55x-9.06x | Bridge from 1 billion USD revenue and 15-18% EBITDA margin |
| Market value / 2026 revenue guidance | About 0.93x | The market is not paying full premium for the transformation story |
The market's sentence is this: "Show me the 2026 guidance; I will give some credit for advanced materials, but because of ACN and monetary profit I will not pay the full premium." That sentence looks fair to me. For AKSA to be very cheap, either the EBITDA margin must become permanent above 18%, advanced materials must create a much more visible separate value than they do today, or the working-capital release must turn into cash discipline. Today's file shows that these are possible; it does not show that they are guaranteed.
The upward path is concrete. If the ACN increase is passed through to selling prices, if technical fiber and carbon grow the 555 million TL advanced-materials EBITDA recorded in 1Q2026, if capacity stays in the 85-90% band, if net financial debt/EBITDA continues to fall, and if operating cash remains positive after the inventory release is over, then the market is being too stingy today. In such a picture, AKSA is priced not only as the old acrylic cycle, but as a scaled and higher value-added materials producer.
The downside is just as clear. If ACN moves into the 1,500-1,800 $/ton band while price pass-through is delayed, if capacity falls after the pull-forward demand of the first quarter, if the EBITDA margin slips below 15%, and if the short-term debt burden remains without declining, today's 1.23x book multiple becomes expensive. Then the investor has not bought a highly utilized factory, but a spread company trapped by raw materials.
The counterargument is strong. AKSA shows with sources that it is one of the world's largest acrylic fiber producers; the quarter is not operationally weak. Domestic market share is 80%, export share is 66%, EBITDA margin is 17.6%. Advanced materials have begun to contribute to profit. The net financial debt/EBITDA ratio has improved. For an industrial asset of this quality, a 7.5-9.1x guided EBITDA range cannot be called a punitive price either.
My judgment: Fairly valued.
To buy AKSA is to accept carrying the full loom in Yalova, the ACN bill, the monetary profit of TAS 29 and the promise of advanced materials at the same time; today the market is neither giving that burden away for free nor paying it more romance than it deserves.