In Talimercan, a 430 MW natural gas combined-cycle power plant entered commercial production in seven months. Aksa Enerji's real capability is selling time before it sells electricity: building a plant quickly for a country that needs urgent power, making the contract long, and often tying the invoice to hard currency. That is why reading AKSEN merely as an "electricity producer" is incomplete. This company's product is speed as much as megawatt-hours.
But speed has a balance-sheet invoice. On the 31 March 2026 balance sheet, short- and long-term financial debt totals TRY 57.3 billion, cash is TRY 4.4 billion; net financial debt is roughly TRY 52.9 billion. In the first quarter of 2026, operating profit was TRY 2.34 billion and depreciation/amortization was TRY 0.98 billion; rough EBITDA was TRY 3.32 billion. Taking last twelve months EBITDA at roughly TRY 14.0 billion, net debt/EBITDA presses against 3.8x.
The question is no longer whether the plant can be built. The question is how many times this speed has already been sold in the share price.
| Area | Sourced datapoint | Investment read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Total installed capacity | 3,058 MW | The company is no longer only a Turkish power generator. |
| Uzbekistan | 1,220 MW; Talimercan 430 MW | The growth engine is fast-commissioned gas capacity. |
| FX-linked guaranteed sales | TRNC 188 MW, Ghana 370 MW, Mali 60 MW, Uzbekistan 1,220 MW | Contracts are the main defense for cash quality. |
| New targets | +1 GW in 2026 and 4 GW total; USD 660 mn EBITDA target in 2028 | The valuation question is whether these targets grow faster than debt. |
The Business Model of Speed
The most important sentence in Aksa Enerji's reports is not "installed capacity above 3,000 MW in 7 countries." The harder sentence is this: the company says it can handle power plant installation with its own technical teams, from project design and procurement through construction and assembly. In other words, AKSEN is less a classic asset owner than a contractor-operator that brings working electricity capacity quickly to countries with urgent power needs.
This model begins in Turkey with large assets such as Antalya 900 MW and Bolu Göynük 270 MW; then it turns into a very different profile through guaranteed sales agreements in the TRNC, Ghana, Mali, and Uzbekistan. The annual report says the TRNC 188 MW, Ghana 370 MW, Mali 60 MW, and Uzbekistan 1,220 MW plants sell electricity under guarantees denominated in U.S. dollars and euros. This is the company's best defense: it is not a producer trapped inside Turkish electricity prices.
Management's bar is not small either. As of 2026, it targets 1 GW of additional installed capacity, 4 GW of total capacity, and USD 660 million of EBITDA in 2028, three times the 2024 level. That target can make AKSEN look cheap; but only if it is achieved. Today's valuation should weigh not the target itself, but the bridge toward it.
Cash on Profit, Concrete on Cash
First-quarter 2026 revenue was TRY 9.95 billion. Gross profit was TRY 2.74 billion, operating profit TRY 2.34 billion. Operationally, it was not a bad quarter. In fact, cash was better than paper profit: cash flow from operating activities was TRY 3.55 billion.
But for this company, saying "it generates cash" is not enough. In the same quarter, TRY 4.86 billion of cash went out for purchases of property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets. Total cash outflow from investing activities was TRY 5.81 billion. The money produced by the operation is being swallowed by the concrete and turbines of growth.
| Item | 2026Q1 | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Parent net income | TRY 0.56 bn | Shareholder-level profit is limited after TMS 29 and tax. |
| Operating cash flow | TRY 3.55 bn | The operating engine produces more cash than accounting profit. |
| PP&E and intangible purchases | TRY -4.86 bn | The investment pace exceeds operating cash generation. |
| OCF less capex | TRY -1.32 bn | Growth is not yet self-funded. |
The income statement should not be read too simply either. Although financing income appears higher than financing expense in Q1, the net monetary position loss was TRY 1.20 billion. Profit before tax was TRY 1.44 billion, while tax expense was TRY 0.64 billion. The result was consolidated net income of TRY 796 million and parent-company net income of TRY 565 million. This shows that the EBITDA story and the net income story are not the same thing.
The Kazancı Table and the Minority Shareholder
Kazancı Holding owned 80.129% of AKSEN as of 31 December 2025. This control structure has to be read in two directions. On one side sits a large group ecosystem across electricity generation, distribution, natural gas, generators, and sales. AKSEN's ability to move quickly may well be fed by that family/group muscle.
On the other side, the public minority shareholder has to know that it is not sitting at the same table. The 2025 related-party table is not a minor footnote: there was TRY 541.7 million of electricity sales and TRY 774.9 million of electricity purchases with Aksa Elektrik Satış, TRY 624.5 million of material purchases from Aksa Jeneratör, and TRY 375.5 million of shared expense charges from Kazancı Holding. Management says no loss arose from these transactions. That statement matters; but it is not a final guarantee for the investor. When control is concentrated in one hand, value transfer risk is watched alongside value creation.
The annual report also states that there are no lawsuits of a nature that could affect the company's financial position, and that 2025 targets were reached. That cleanliness is good news. Still, AKSEN's main risk sits less in the court file than in the balance-sheet and geography file: debt, public authorities providing guarantees, collection, contract renewal, and currency convertibility.
The Question Asked by Price
According to 18 May 2026 market data, the share was TRY 79.85 and market capitalization was TRY 97.92 billion. Add TRY 52.92 billion of net financial debt, and enterprise value becomes TRY 150.84 billion. TTM EBITDA is roughly TRY 13.99 billion. The multiple: 10.8x.
| Input | Value | Source / calculation |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 97.92 bn | 18 May 2026 market data. |
| Net financial debt | TRY 52.92 bn | Short + long financial debt less cash. |
| Enterprise value | TRY 150.84 bn | Market value + net financial debt. |
| TTM EBITDA | TRY 13.99 bn | 2025FY + 2026Q1 - 2025Q1. |
| EV/EBITDA | 10.8x | Enterprise value / TTM EBITDA. |
| Parent equity | TRY 64.14 bn | 2026Q1 balance sheet. |
| Market value / parent equity | 1.53x | Market value / parent equity. |
This multiple does not allow the easy line that "electricity producers are cheap in Turkey." Market capitalization is also 1.53 times parent-company equity of TRY 64.14 billion. Annualizing Q1 parent-company profit alone would be unfair; TMS 29, tax, and the investment cycle are pressing down net income. But precisely for that reason, buying the stock only on "future EBITDA" is risky too. Today's price has already placed part of the 2028 target on the table.
The cleanest way to bring the 2028 target back to today is not to invent an exchange-rate forecast, but to leave the formula visible: today's TRY 150.84 billion enterprise value turns into a forward multiple only by dividing it by USD 660 million of target EBITDA multiplied by the chosen USD/TRY rate. In other words, the bull case is not the target alone; it is debt, cash conversion, and currency all working in the shareholder's favor on the way to that target.
The second company-specific reading is the capacity and balance-sheet bridge. On 3,058 MW of installed capacity, today's enterprise value is roughly TRY 49.3 million/MW. Property, plant, equipment, and intangible assets total roughly TRY 115.7 billion; the market's enterprise value is about 1.3 times this asset base. That breaks the sentence "the assets are coming for free." What is being bought in AKSEN is not the asset, but the speed and guarantee premium.
The Strongest Counter-Thesis
Being bearish is easy; here, easy bearishness would be wrong. Aksa Enerji really can build power plants. Talimercan is not a slogan. Management says 2025 targets were reached. The hard-currency guaranteed sales in the TRNC, Ghana, Mali, and Uzbekistan may offer a higher-quality cash profile than the volatility of the Turkish electricity market. New projects such as Gabon and Burkina Faso may add new muscle to the same machine.
If capacity growth in 2026, cash conversion in 2027, and the USD 660 million EBITDA target in 2028 become visible, today's 10.8x trailing multiple may look early rather than expensive in hindsight. That is this report's fairest counter-sentence.
But today's investment decision is not the question, "Is the company good?" The company may be good. The question is the price of that goodness.
What Would Change It?
The first place to look next period will not be the income statement, but net debt/EBITDA. If net financial debt stays around TRY 52.9 billion while TTM EBITDA breaks upward, the market's current confidence will start to look justified. If net debt grows and EBITDA stays flat, the story turns from speed into leverage risk.
The second datapoint is collection and contract quality. The foreign guaranteed-sales sentence is attractive; but a guarantee is worth only as much as its conversion into cash. If trade receivables, operating cash, and country-level disclosures deteriorate, the quality premium carrying the stock can be taken back quickly.
The third datapoint is management language. If the targets of 1 GW additional capacity, 4 GW total installed capacity, and USD 660 million EBITDA in 2028 are preserved, the market can wait. If the targets soften, today's multiple hardens.
Verdict
Overvalued
I reach this judgment not because AKSEN is a weak company, but because the possibility of becoming a good company has been prepaid too heavily into today's price. This stock is not a patient asset discount; it is a growth bet accelerated by debt, defended by hard-currency contracts, but asking investors to fund the 2028 bridge today.
The final sentence is simple: owning AKSEN means believing not in a power plant, but in a stopwatch overtaking a debt ledger.