In Altınay's activity report, the Ironbird is not a metaphor; it is test infrastructure for platforms such as KAAN and HÜRJET. According to the report, installation and commissioning have been completed for the Demirkuş test infrastructure signed in 2023, and acceptance activities are ongoing. This is how defense works: first comes engineering, then the prototype, then testing, then acceptance, and only after that does the invoice appear in the income statement.
What the investor is buying in ALTNY shares is precisely this waiting. As of March 31, 2026, the company disclosed a $200 million backlog. In the same quarter, consolidated revenue was TL 558.5 million, gross profit was TL 220.1 million, operating profit was TL 87.7 million, and net loss was TL 78.8 million. The market, using May 18, 2026 data, values the company at TL 17.31 billion.
That is why the question is not as simple as "will the defense sector grow?" It may. According to the report, Turkey's defense exports rose to $10.01 billion in 2025 and increased by 12% in the first quarter of 2026 compared with the same period of the prior year. Altınay's field is not random either: motion control systems, unmanned systems, naval systems, weapon systems, ammunition disposal systems, test infrastructures, the KUŞKAPANI helicopter capture system, MİLGEM fuel transfer systems, and KAAN and HÜRJET subsystems. These are not simple subcontracting jobs.
But a good company and a good price are not the same thing.
| Metric | 1Q2025 | 1Q2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | TRY 834.2m | TRY 558.5m |
| Operating profit | TRY 273.8m | TRY 87.7m |
| Parent net income | TRY 81.9m | TRY -54.2m |
The first-quarter income statement shows where the story is under strain. Revenue fell from TL 834.2 million in the first quarter of 2025 to TL 558.5 million. Gross margin remains high at 39.4%; this does not deny the value added in the work the company performs. But operating profit declined from TL 273.8 million to TL 87.7 million. Profit attributable to the parent swung from TL 81.9 million profit to TL 54.2 million loss.
This loss is not entirely operational decay. The tax line is severe: while the company recorded TL 85.6 million in profit before tax, it moved to a TL 78.8 million net loss because of TL 164.4 million in deferred tax expense. Cash flow is also better than the income statement; there was TL 216.5 million in cash inflow from operating activities. But investing activities produced TL 308.2 million in cash outflow, of which TL 302.1 million went to purchases of tangible and intangible fixed assets. The cash box collects with one hand and buries money into projects with the other.
Altınay's real business appears here: the company is not a "sell the product, take the money" machine; it is a machine for holding and converting projects. On the March 31, 2026 balance sheet, there is TL 1.21 billion in ongoing project costs. Intangible assets are TL 3.84 billion. Behind this stand projects developed with the company's own resources; in the financial footnote, the gross cost of development expenditures has reached TL 4.34 billion.
This can be good, and it can be dangerous. In the good scenario, the engineering waiting in the ledger turns into future delivery, delivery into revenue, and revenue into high-margin profit. In the bad scenario, those same lines become a storage room financed by the investor's patience.
The company's customer and partnership fabric also makes this waiting more complex. Altınay owns 50% of TAAC with TUSAŞ and owns all of DASAL. The Q1 activity report says TAAC is working on landing gear, flight control actuators, simulator and test systems for KAAN, HÜRJET, HÜRKUŞ, GÖKBEY, and international platforms. On the DASAL side, heavy-class cargo UAVs have entered operational use, and orders have arrived for swarm UAVs and reconnaissance-surveillance systems.
But in the financial footnote, TUSAŞ appears not only as a strategic partner, but also as the heavy customer of the income statement. In the first quarter of 2026, all related-party sales were made to TUSAŞ, totaling TL 354.4 million. That equals about 63.5% of total revenue. At the same date, there were TL 183.0 million in trade receivables from TUSAŞ and TL 693.4 million in order advances received.
This alone is not bad. Prime contractor concentration is natural in the defense industry. But for the small partner, the question changes: how much of Altınay's pricing power, delivery schedule, and cash conversion is truly in its own hands? The large related-party customer is both a sign of project quality and a dependency risk.
That is why it would be wrong to write TAAC and DASAL into the valuation as a flat "strategic affiliate premium." TAAC carries the most attractive words of KAAN and HÜRJET, but Altınay's economic share is 50%, and across the table is TUSAŞ, which is also a customer. DASAL is 100% Altınay's, but the report does not provide a separate DASAL income statement, EBITDA, or order breakdown. Therefore, the solid valuation surface we have is not "TAAC is worth this, DASAL is worth that"; it is how fast, at what margin, and with what cash discipline the total $200 million backlog descends into the income statement.
| Risk item | 31 March 2026 |
|---|---|
| Continuing project costs | TRY 1.21bn |
| Intangible assets | TRY 3.84bn |
| Short-term financial borrowings | TRY 1.88bn |
| Cash plus short/long financial investments | TRY 331.7m |
| Total guarantees, pledges and mortgages | TRY 9.88bn |
| Guarantees for other group companies | TRY 2.98bn |
| Order advances from related parties | TRY 700.9m |
| Q1 sales to TAI/TUSAŞ | TRY 354.4m |
The balance sheet asks the second question: how comfortably is this waiting being financed?
As of March 31, 2026, short-term financial debt was TL 1.88 billion. Cash and financial investments together remained at about TL 331.7 million. After deducting cash from financial debt, net debt was TL 1.92 billion; in the company's own capital risk note, the net debt/capital employed ratio is 26%. This ratio alone is not fatal. But the debt maturity is short, while project conversion depends on the engineering calendar.
The sharper item is collateral. The group's total guarantees, pledges, mortgages, and sureties amount to TL 9.88 billion. Of this, TL 5.998 billion is on behalf of its own legal entity, TL 900.2 million is in favor of DASAL, and TL 2.98 billion is in favor of other group companies. There are also first- and second-degree mortgages in favor of Vakıfbank on the land in Dilovası. Beneath a technology story, the banker's file is also present.
Control is clear on the management side. Hakan Altınay holds 60.01% of the capital. A and B group shares carry five voting rights at the general assembly and the privilege to nominate board members; C group shares have no privilege. This structure may accelerate founder vision, but for the minority investor it makes the sentence "I trust" compulsory. Especially when there are related-party sales, advances, and sureties granted in favor of other group companies, management quality is not only an operational matter but a capital allocation matter.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Share price | TRY 17.31 |
| Market value | TRY 17.31bn |
| Net debt after cash | TRY 1.92bn |
| EV after cash and financial investments | TRY 19.15bn |
| Backlog | USD 200m, about TRY 8.88bn |
| Market cap / backlog | 1.95x |
| EV / backlog | 2.16x |
| Market cap / parent equity | 3.44x |
| EV / annualized 1Q2026 EBITDA | 26.1x |
| Item | Test | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| TAAC economic stake | 50% | Exposure to KAAN/HURJET/HURKUS/GOKBEY systems; TAI/TUSAS is both 50% partner and main customer. |
| DASAL economic stake | 100% | Heavy cargo UAV, swarm UAV and reconnaissance/surveillance orders exist; no standalone P&L split is disclosed. |
| Backlog in TRY | USD 200m x 44.40 = TRY 8.88bn | Total backlog; no TAAC/DASAL margin or delivery-year split is disclosed. |
| Gross-profit potential at Q1 margin | TRY 8.88bn x 39.4% = TRY 3.50bn | Market cap is about 4.9x this one-cycle gross profit. |
| Gross-profit potential at haircut margin | TRY 8.88bn x 25% = TRY 2.22bn | Enterprise value is about 8.6x this gross profit. |
| Conclusion | No standalone SOTP | Because separate TAAC/DASAL EBITDA is not disclosed, valuation depends on backlog conversion speed and margin discipline. |
The valuation hardens here. According to May 18, 2026 market data, the share price is TL 17.31 and the market value is TL 17.31 billion. After deducting cash and financial investments from financial debt, enterprise value is roughly TL 19.15 billion.
The company's disclosed $200 million backlog equals about TL 8.88 billion using the 44.40 USD/TL rate derived from the dollar loan balance and TL equivalent in the financial debt note. In other words, the market value is about 1.95 times backlog; enterprise value is 2.16 times backlog. This ratio alone does not say expensive or cheap, because the backlog's gross margin, delivery year, and renewal speed are unknown. But it makes clear what the investor is paying for: the market wants the order backlog not merely to turn into revenue, but to do so at high margin and to be renewed with new orders.
If we apply the Q1 gross margin of 39.4% to the TL 8.88 billion backlog, a single cycle implies roughly TL 3.5 billion of gross profit potential; market value is about 4.9 times that. Under a harsher but defensible 25% gross margin haircut, this potential falls to TL 2.2 billion; enterprise value approaches 8.6 times this gross profit. This is not a SOTP, because there is no separately verifiable EBITDA for TAAC and DASAL. It is a more honest look-through test: the market is buying in advance not today's loss-making statement, but backlog gross profit that must pass through the partnership, acceptance, and margin filters.
The second method looks at current earnings power. If TL 95.8 million of depreciation and amortization is added to Q1 operating profit, quarterly EBITDA comes out to about TL 183.5 million. Mechanically annualizing that gives TL 734 million. The TL 19.15 billion enterprise value is 26.1 times this annualized EBITDA. Moreover, net profit attributable to the parent is negative. This is not a "cheap defense stock"; it is "the expensive purchase today of future deliveries."
Equity says the same thing. Equity attributable to the parent is TL 5.03 billion. The TL 17.31 billion market value means 3.44x price/equity attributable to the parent. If a significant part of this equity is a door to the future through development assets and project inventories, the premium is understandable. If that door opens slowly, the premium grows heavy.
The bull thesis is fair and strong. Backlog rose from $182 million at year-end 2025 to $200 million at the end of the first quarter of 2026. The company's products touch Turkey's most visible defense platforms. Gross margin has remained high. Operating cash flow is positive. Q1 weakness may be a gap in the delivery calendar. If in the rest of 2026 MİLGEM integrations, KUŞKAPANI acceptance processes, KAAN/HÜRJET subsystems, and DASAL orders flow more quickly into the income statement, today's multiples may look expensive backward but still carryable forward.
The bear thesis is simpler and, for now, stronger: a large part of the company's value comes not from realized profit but from projects expected to materialize. Short-term debt is high, the collateral file is thick, related-party concentration is visible, intangible assets are large, and ongoing project costs are rising. This structure is rewarded in high growth; it is punished in delay.
For that reason, my verdict is Expensive. This does not mean Altınay is a bad company. On the contrary, the sources show a real engineering machine. The problem is that the market is already pricing the future output of that machine quite generously. Until the quality of the $200 million backlog is proven, a TL 17.31 billion market value asks too much faith from the investor.
The data that would change this view is clear: in Q2 and Q3, the backlog converting rapidly into revenue, gross margin not deteriorating, operating cash carrying investment spending and short-term debt pressure more comfortably, and related-party and collateral risk not growing. Then the "Ironbird waiting in the ledger" truly takes to the runway. Until then, owning ALTNY shares means buying not today's factory, but an engineering promise whose acceptance minutes are not yet complete.