The most honest sentence in Borusan Yatırım's Q1 activity report does not open the door of a factory; it says there is no door. The company has no production or sales activity. This is not a crime; it is the business. The investor buying BRYAT is not making galvanized steel in Gemlik, laying pipelines, selling cars in a BMW showroom, or renting out Caterpillar machinery. The investor is paying for the exchange-listed glass of an average 9-person portfolio room at the Baltalimanı address.
That glass is not cheap today. In the 31 March 2026 balance sheet, equity attributable to the parent is 35,7 billion TL. The 18 May 2026 market data values BRYAT at 54,9 billion TL. The 19,2 billion TL gap is not a small air pocket to be waved away as "Borusan quality." If cash, funds, long-term financial investments and other assets are taken at book, and liabilities are deducted, the market is saying the private investee shelf should be worth roughly 39,0 billion TL against its 19,7 billion TL book value.
That is why my judgment on BRYAT is expensive. There is a debt-free, liquid, high-quality portfolio; but the current price has already prepaid a large part of that quality.
The Shelves Behind the Glass
BRYAT's shelf is not empty. The till holds 4,20 billion TL in cash and cash equivalents, and 1,33 billion TL in short-term financial investments. Long-term financial investments stand at 12,26 billion TL: Borçelik, Borusan Birleşik Boru and Supsan. Investments accounted for using the equity method are 19,74 billion TL: Borusan Makina ve Güç Sistemleri, Borusan Lojistik, Borusan Oto and the automotive distribution/rental companies. There is no financial debt; most total liabilities are the 1,84 billion TL deferred tax liability.
| Item | 31 March 2026 | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | TRY 4.20bn | Main part of the debt-free cash box |
| Short-term financial investments | TRY 1.33bn | Investment fund |
| Long-term financial investments | TRY 12.26bn | Borcelik, Borusan Boru and Supsan |
| Equity-accounted investments | TRY 19.74bn | Automotive, machinery and logistics associates |
| Total liabilities | TRY 1.92bn | TRY 1.84bn is deferred tax |
At first glance, this table offers defense. The holding company's cash box is not empty, there is no debt wall, and the assets rest on real companies. But a good balance sheet and a good price are not the same thing. In an industrial company, you discuss capacity, orders, margins and the investment cycle. In BRYAT, the central question is simpler: what hidden value above the visible portfolio is the stock market price buying?
The concreteness of the portfolio does not remove this question. It sharpens it. In long-term financial investments, Borusan Birleşik Boru is carried at 6,65 billion TL, Borçelik at 5,54 billion TL, and Supsan at 72,0 million TL. On the private side, BMGS is carried at 8,98 billion TL, Borusan Lojistik at 6,78 billion TL, Borusan Oto at 1,99 billion TL, with the automotive companies and leasing making up the rest. The market takes these shelves at book and almost adds another shelf on top.
Where Profit Comes From
The income statement shows 186,4 million TL of "revenue." Read together with the Q1 activity report's sentence that there is "no production and sales," the meaning of this line changes: this is not a product sales machine, but a portfolio dividend. Cash flow teaches the same lesson. In the first quarter of 2026, net income was 162,3 million TL; yet cash flow from operating activities was negative 78,8 million TL after a 1,01 billion TL tax payment. The main piece of the 213,5 million TL from investing activities was the 186,4 million TL dividend received.
This is not a bad picture; but if read incorrectly, it becomes an expensive one. BRYAT's profit flows not from customer invoices, but from the portfolio's calendar, dividend decisions, equity-method accounting and currency/fair value movements. The company's functional currency is the US dollar; its financials are presented in TL. In Q1, there was a 1,21 billion TL foreign currency translation gain in other comprehensive income, while financial asset values fell by 754,2 million TL. Net income alone is not the full picture.
| Associate | Q1 2026 net profit/loss | BRYAT reading |
|---|---|---|
| BMGS | TRY -265.7mn | The largest private shelf started weak |
| Borusan Lojistik | TRY -39.3mn | Logistics did not produce Q1 profit |
| Borusan Oto | TRY -12.0mn | Retail auto side was negative |
| Borusan Otomotiv | TRY 210.9mn | Distribution side was profitable |
| Borusan Otomotiv Premium Kiralama | TRY 324.2mn | The strongest Q1 profit contributor |
The equity-method investees do not speak with one voice either. In the first quarter of 2026, Borusan Otomotiv posted 210,9 million TL profit and Borusan Otomotiv Premium Kiralama posted 324,2 million TL profit. In the same period, BMGS reported a 265,7 million TL loss, Borusan Lojistik a 39,3 million TL loss, and Borusan Oto a 12,0 million TL loss. The equity-method profit share falling into BRYAT's income statement remained at 42,1 million TL.
These figures do not say the private portfolio is worthless. But they show the job the market assigns to that portfolio in order to defend today's price. If other assets are carried at book, the private investees shown at 19,74 billion TL on the books need to be worth roughly 38,96 billion TL to justify the market value. In other words, at today's price the investor is assigning the private portfolio about a 1,97x book multiple. In a holding company, where a discount is normally expected, this is quite an assertive premium.
Whoever Controls, Controls the Calendar
On 31 March 2026, Borusan Holding's stake was %64,13. On 15 April 2026, 587.000 shares owned by Zehra Nurhan Kocabıyık were sold off-exchange to Borusan Holding at 2.169 TL per 1 TL nominal share; the Holding's stake rose to %66,22. Because this price is above the 1.994 TL market price on 18 May, it is one of the bull case's best signs: the controlling shareholder is not leaving the table; it is increasing its stake.
But a control purchase and minority return are not the same thing. Registered Class A privileged shares, %70 affirmative vote requirements, unlimited external roles for board members, and a structure where minority rights are tied to general provisions remind the investor of this: the public shareholder does not buy the chair at Borusan's table, but the view of the table through glass.
| Topic | Data | Meaning for investors |
|---|---|---|
| Borusan Holding stake | 64.13% at 31 March 2026 | Control is not with public investors |
| After 15 April 2026 transaction | Borusan Holding 66.22% | Control became more concentrated |
| Transaction price | TRY 2,169 per TRY 1 nominal share | The controlling shareholder bought above the later market price |
| Investor-relations questions | 55 questions in Q1 | Expectations include buyback, bonus issue, liquidity and more supportive disclosures |
The Q1 activity report says the investor relations unit received 55 questions in Q1. The subjects of those questions reveal the pulse of a company: controlling shareholder transactions, whether the price movement was based on company-sourced information, paid or bonus capital increases, buybacks, trading liquidity, and the expectation of more frequent, share-supportive disclosures. The street knows the assets behind the display; it asks when the glass will open.
This distinction is hard in valuation. Even if hidden value truly exists, the minority investor does not determine on what calendar, at what price, through what transaction, and in whose favor it will be unlocked. BRYAT's strength is control discipline; its weakness is the waiting cost born of the same discipline.
Two Valuation Doors
The first door is the classic multiple. The 54,91 billion TL market value is 1,54 times the 35,70 billion TL equity. If you annualize Q1 net income, the multiple looks absurdly high at 84,6x; if you take 2025 net income as the base, it falls to about 11,8x. These two extremes show why holding-company earnings alone are not enough for a decision. As the dividend calendar and equity-method line move, P/E moves too. For BRYAT, P/B is the cleaner first test; the answer of that test is not "discount," but "premium."
The second door is more company-specific. Cash is 4,20 billion TL, short-term financial investments are 1,33 billion TL, long-term financial investments are 12,26 billion TL, other assets are about 77,5 million TL, and total liabilities are 1,92 billion TL. If these items are taken at book, the equity-method private investees need to be worth roughly 38,96 billion TL to carry the 54,91 billion TL market value. In the financial statements, this portfolio is carried at 19,74 billion TL.
This is not a definitive private-company valuation; but it is the right market question. The market is telling us: "the private portfolio is worth nearly twice book." My objection is not to the quality of Borusan assets, but to today's price demanding payment in advance for the unproven part of that quality.
The bull side should not be dismissed. The Borusan brand, debt-free balance sheet, foreign-currency-heavy cash, high dividends distributed between 2022-2024, 4,64 billion TL net income in 2025, and the controlling shareholder's purchase at 2.169 TL are real arguments. If BMGS and logistics losses remain temporary, the automotive side stays strong, Borusan Boru/Borçelik values rise, or a sale/listing story emerges from the private assets, today's premium will look more reasonable.
But an investment judgment is not built on the word "could." In Q1, portfolio profit is fragmented, operating cash after tax is negative, and there is no direct public value-unlocking evidence that the private investees deserve roughly twice book. In this picture, the claim of cheapness rests more on reputation than evidence.
The Path of Capital Impairment
In BRYAT, capital loss does not come from a classic debt crisis; there is no financial debt. The risk is quieter.
First, premium compression. Even if the stock merely falls from 1,54x book to 1,2x book, the investor can lose money without the company failing, the portfolio being sold, or a factory closing. Second, weak quarters in the private portfolio. If large shelves such as BMGS and logistics keep posting losses, the 1,97x private portfolio assumption cannot be carried. Third, price and currency volatility. The financial risk note says a %10 move in Borusan Birleşik Boru's value would move other comprehensive income by 665,0 million TL; a %10 move by the euro and TL against the US dollar could also affect pre-tax profit by 206,7 million TL. Fourth, control timing. Even if value is unlocked, there is no guarantee that it will happen in favor of the minority or on the date the minority expects.
None of this makes the company distressed. On the contrary, BRYAT carries a solid balance sheet. But a solid balance sheet does not automatically forgive a high price.
Verdict
BRYAT is expensive. This verdict does not reject the Borusan portfolio; it says the price has run ahead of the portfolio. Against the 35,7 billion TL equity shown on the books, the 54,9 billion TL market value and the 1,97x implied book multiple required for the private investees ask too much optimism from today's investor.
Who is this stock for? For the patient investor who believes that Borusan quality is hidden in private assets far above book, that the controlling shareholder will unlock this value over time in a way that also satisfies the minority, and that weak Q1 investee profits are temporary. Who is it not for? Not for the investor who says "it is Borusan, therefore it is cheap" and buys without looking at book, control and cash flow.
The data to watch is clear: profit recovery in private investees, value movements in Borusan Boru/Borçelik, the dividend calendar, new controlling shareholder transactions, buyback/capital actions, and any sale or public offering that would reveal the real value of private assets. Until those data arrive, owning BRYAT means accepting not a factory, but Borusan's portfolio behind glass, watched at a premium to book.