The kiln in Söke does not fall silent. Clinker comes out, cement is sold, exports grow; the annual report says Batısöke increased cement exports by 65.69% in 2025. Yet the real sound of this story does not come from the production line. It comes from lower down the income statement: TL 402.7 million in gross profit against TL 1.04 billion in finance costs.
That is why the investment question in BSOKE is not as simple as “will the cement sector recover?” The question is this: is the market buying a working kiln, or is it paying upfront for a large improvement that has not yet entered the financial statements?
The 2025 answer is harsh. Revenue was TL 5.815 billion, operating loss TL 342 million, net loss TL 120 million. Cash flow looks better at first glance: TL 808 million of cash inflow from operations. But in the same year there was TL 486 million of investment outflow and TL 602 million of interest paid. The kiln produces cash; before it reaches the shareholder, it thins at the door of debt.
Batısöke’s physical business is clear: clinker and cement production in Aydın Söke, grinding and packaging in Burdur Çavdır, and ash production and sales through ASH Plus/Ecowest acquired in 2025. Control sits with Batıçim: 74.62% of the capital belongs to the parent. Group A shares carry privileges in the election of board members; economic control and the management gate sit at the same table.
The revenue composition does not wear a mask either. In 2025, domestic sales were TL 3.576 billion, international sales TL 2.256 billion. Cement domestic sales in the Aegean Region fell 2.58%, while exports rose 32.70%. For Batısöke specifically, non-group domestic cement sales fell 11.71%, while cement exports grew 65.69%. The company tried to offset a weak domestic market with exports.
The limit of that good news is in the cost table. Of TL 5.815 billion in revenue, TL 5.412 billion goes to cost of sales. Gross margin is 6.9%. Within marketing, sales and distribution expenses, export, freight/transport and loading expenses are TL 470 million. Exports are growing; but in cement, reaching a distant customer is not free.
Moreover, the financing line carries not only interest but also currency. The financial report shows TL 3.017 billion of financial debt; most of it is in dollars, euros and floating-rate debt. The group’s net foreign currency liability position is TL 2.509 billion. According to the report’s sensitivity table, a 10% appreciation of foreign currencies against the TL has a TL 250.9 million negative impact on pre-tax profit.
Read alone, that figure may seem small. When net loss is TL 120 million, a TL 251 million pre-tax effect from a 10% currency move is not small. It shows that the stock is tied not only to cement prices, but also to the interest and currency ledger.
Management has not entirely ignored this reality. In 2025, the alternative fuel usage rate rose to 10.5%; energy generated from waste heat covered 7% of total electricity consumption. The company says it has started investments in an RDF preparation and feeding facility and an additional waste-heat power generation facility with 4 MW capacity, and that these facilities are planned to be commissioned in 2026.
These are steps in the right direction. In cement, energy cost is not fate, but it behaves like fate. Waste fuel and waste heat are among the places where gross margin can be repaired. Yet the gap in scale is hard: an additional 4 MW energy project may matter for the narrative; it will not dissolve TL 1.04 billion of finance costs on its own.
The company made another balance-sheet move in 2025. TL 2.617 billion of short-term other payables to Batıçim, including the effect of inflation accounting, was contributed as a capital advance. This reduced short-term related-party debt pressure and strengthened the equity appearance. While the 2024 balance sheet showed TL 2.467 billion of other payables to related parties, this line appears to have been zeroed by the end of 2025.
But this relief is not a costless investment thesis. The same annual report says Batıçim applied to the CMB on January 22, 2026 to convert its TL 352 million nominal BSOKE shares into exchange-tradable status. The proceeds are planned to be used for financial liabilities and renewable energy investments. Batısöke also says it applied for a private placement capital increase in return for the capital advance, with the pre-emptive rights of shareholders other than Batıçim restricted.
For minority investors, those two sentences matter. The parent may be reducing debt pressure by contributing capital. At the same time, the prospect of shares entering the free float and a private placement capital increase makes the ownership math more delicate when valuation is not cheap.
| Risk line | 2025 data | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Financial debt | TL 3.017bn | Includes bank loans, lease liabilities, and long-term borrowings |
| Net foreign currency liability | TL 2.509bn | A 10% FX move affects pre-tax profit by TL 250.9mn |
| Total guarantees, pledges and mortgages given | TL 18.923bn | The refinancing and group collateral chain sits on the balance sheet |
| Guarantees for other group companies | TL 892mn | Equal to 7.07% of equity |
| Batıçim control | 74.62% | Class A shares carry board nomination privilege |
| Capital advance | TL 2.617bn | Conversion of short-term other debt owed to Batıçim into capital advance |
On valuation, the stock is hard to defend. In the market data dated May 19, 2026, the price is TL 37.94 and market value is TL 60.7 billion. After subtracting cash from financial debt, net debt is about TL 3.0 billion; enterprise value is about TL 63.7 billion.
2025 EBITDA, using a simple operating loss plus depreciation calculation, is TL 427 million. That means 149x EV/EBITDA. Enterprise value is 11.0x revenue. Equity book value is TL 12.6 billion; market value is 4.8 times book value.
For a cement company, book value does not explain everything. There is land, plant, export channel, energy investment, cyclical trough. But here the market is not buying a cheap asset. Against TL 13.7 billion of property, plant and equipment and about TL 0.9 billion of core working capital, TL 63.7 billion of enterprise value is being paid. That is roughly 4.3 times the tangible working capital and plant base.
| Bridge | Value | Read |
|---|---|---|
| Market capitalization | TL 60.7bn | Current market value at TL 37.94 per share |
| Enterprise value | TL 63.7bn | Market capitalization plus roughly TL 3.0bn net debt |
| 2025 EBITDA | TL 427mn | Operating loss plus depreciation and amortization |
| EV/EBITDA | 149x | A transformation price, not a normal industrial multiple |
| EBITDA required for 10x EV/EBITDA | TL 6.37bn | About 15 times 2025 EBITDA |
| Revenue required at 20% EBITDA margin | TL 31.8bn | About 5.5 times 2025 revenue |
For this price to be reasonable, one of two things must happen. Either Batısöke’s normal EBITDA rapidly rises far above 2025, to a level of several billion TL. Or the market continues to attach a very high strategic premium to cement assets, even during a period of unprofitability.
Put the first path into numbers. For the current enterprise value to look reasonable at 10x EV/EBITDA, still a generous multiple, annual EBITDA would need to be about TL 6.37 billion. That is almost 15 times 2025 EBITDA. Even assuming a 20% EBITDA margin, this implies TL 31.8 billion of sales; about 5.5 times 2025 sales. At a 12% margin, required sales rise to TL 53.1 billion.
The bull case is not empty. 2025 may be a poor base. The Aegean domestic market was weak, exports were strong, debt declined versus 2024, and related-party debt turned into a capital advance. There is an Euler Hermes policy to manage receivable risk and preparation for Türk Eximbank domestic receivables insurance. Waste fuel and waste heat investments may repair margin to some degree. If interest rates fall, finance costs may also loosen.
That is why the right judgment is not “the company is bad.” The right judgment is “the stock is expensive.” The distinction matters. Batısöke is an industrial company with real assets, an export channel, and parent support. But today’s price is not owning proven profitability; it is pre-claiming a large part of a possible recovery.
The third layer of risk is collateral and group relationships. The financial report shows total guarantees, pledges and mortgages given by the company of TL 18.9 billion. Of this, TL 18.0 billion is on behalf of its own legal entity, while TL 892 million consists of guarantees given in favor of other group companies. Under the refinancing agreement, Batıçim and Batısöke properties carry USD 400 million of first-degree mortgages and TL 2.6 billion of second-degree mortgages and movable pledges.
This does not mean there will be a crisis tomorrow morning. But what the shareholder must know is this: this balance sheet is not only a factory balance sheet; it is a balance sheet that must be read together with group financing, the collateral chain, and parent-company decisions.
The data that would change the judgment is simple. If in 2026 operating profit turns positive, annualized EBITDA rises above TL 2 billion, the ratio of finance costs to revenue falls below 10%, net foreign currency liabilities decline, and capital transactions do not create pressure against minorities, the tone of this report would have to change. Then we would not be talking about a “kiln working for interest,” but a “kiln coming out of debt.”
We are not there today.
Verdict: Expensive. Becoming a partner in Batısöke is not buying the current earnings of the kiln in Söke; it is buying an expensive expectation that this kiln can quickly solve its debt, currency, energy and ownership knot.