In a cement company, you expect profit to come out of the kiln. Batıçim’s 2025 books say the opposite: stone-and-earth products generated 8.96 billion TL in revenue but wrote a 412.7 million TL operating loss; ready-mix concrete lost 141.8 million TL despite 4.03 billion TL in revenue; energy was also 81.7 million TL in the red. The place that truly carried the group’s operating profit was not the kiln, but the port: 547.6 million TL of operating profit came out of 1.11 billion TL in port revenue.
That is why this cannot be closed with the sentence “the cement cycle was bad.” While Turkey’s cement production and exports rose, the company’s total cement tonnage fell 1.53% on a solo basis; clinker exports grew, exports in the Aegean were alive, yet consolidated operating profit still turned negative. The harsh sentence in the ledger is this: Batıçim owns heavy assets and carries a large story, but in 2025 the profit engine was running in the wrong place.
| Segment | Operating profit / loss |
|---|---|
| Stone and earth-based products | -412.7 mn TRY |
| Ready-mix concrete | -141.8 mn TRY |
| Port services | 547.6 mn TRY |
| Electricity generation | -81.7 mn TRY |
The company’s economic machine has four parts: cement/clinker, ready-mix concrete, port, and energy. Most revenue comes from stone-earth products and concrete; the cleanest profit comes from the port. This separation is the heart of the investment thesis. If port profit normalizes or the cement-concrete side does not recover, very little current profit remains to carry the group’s present market value.
The 2025 income statement is not a nominal disaster; it is something more insidious. Revenue is 14.29 billion TL, gross profit is 1.44 billion TL, depreciation and amortization is 1.31 billion TL. But the core operating result is an 88.6 million TL loss, and the parent-company net result is a 228.8 million TL loss. Moreover, two accounting supports kept the net loss from looking uglier: 1.68 billion TL of net monetary gain and 288.1 million TL of deferred tax income.
Cash flow looks better at first glance: 1.99 billion TL of cash inflow from operating activities. That matters; the company was able to put cash into the till while losing money on paper. But here too, the source is not clean profit. Cash flow includes a 961.7 million TL working-capital improvement and a 1.31 billion TL depreciation/amortization adjustment. In other words, the cash comes not from the kiln’s high margin, but from tightening the balance sheet and amortizing the old investment base.
The debt side does not show crisis, but it does not show freedom either. Financial debt is 5.72 billion TL; cash is 212.1 million TL; net financial debt is 5.51 billion TL. Net debt/equity of 22.23% is not an alarm by itself. But the currency composition is more uncomfortable: the net foreign-currency liability position is 4.68 billion TL, and a 10% move in the dollar/euro has a 480.4 million TL pre-tax profit impact. That is an FX sensitivity more than twice the 2025 parent-company loss.
The governance ledger also places “public heavy industry” beside “control architecture.” Çiftay is the largest shareholder with 38.07%; the nominal value of the privileged A-group shares is only 48,000 TL, yet they carry privileges over board-candidate nomination, 15 votes per share, and 10% of net profit. The related-party note shows 162.8 million TL of trade receivables from Çiftay, 15.5 million TL of trade payables, and 167.5 million TL of goods/service sales in 2025. None of these is a red card on its own; but they are details that make it harder for a minority investor to read this stock as a pure asset discount.
The qualified opinion in the auditor’s report is the shortest and heaviest sentence in the file. A recoverable amount study could not be performed for the 1.319 billion TL net book value of Batıçim Enerji’s concession-linked intangible assets belonging to the Kovada I and Kovada II hydroelectric plants. It would be unfair to say this entire asset group is worth zero. But an asset for which the auditor says “I could not determine whether an adjustment is necessary” cannot be written into the investor’s mind at full value either.
| Item | 2025Q4 | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Net financial debt | TRY 5.51 bn | Leverage is not a crisis, but recovery remains tied to funding cost. |
| Net foreign-currency liability | TRY 4.68 bn | Currency moves can quickly damage the income statement. |
| Impact of a 10% USD/EUR move | TRY 480.4 mn | The sensitivity is roughly twice the 2025 parent net loss. |
| Kovada I-II concession asset | TRY 1.32 bn | The auditor said recoverable value testing could not be performed. |
| Total guarantees, pledges and mortgages | TRY 26.18 bn | The refinancing security package limits balance-sheet flexibility. |
That is why valuation has to be unforgiving. In the market data dated May 19, 2026, the share price is 6.13 TL and the market capitalization is 36.62 billion TL. Add net debt, and enterprise value is roughly 42.13 billion TL. Since there is an operating loss in 2025, the classic P/E is meaningless; EV/EBITDA, calculated on roughly 1.22 billion TL of EBITDA by adding depreciation/amortization to operating profit, is 34.6x. This does not look like a trough multiple for a weak year; it looks like a success premium before the success has arrived.
The second approach should look at the company’s own separation. If you value the port at a reasonable, not generous, 8x operating profit, it produces roughly 4.38 billion TL of enterprise value for the port. The remaining 37.75 billion TL of enterprise value is left to cement, concrete, energy, and the asset option, all of which wrote losses in total in 2025. Inside that option are land, machinery, the port license, the Aliağa project, and Batısöke shares; but an option is not profit.
| Approach | Calculation | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 36.62 bn | Based on TRY 6.13 share price and market data. |
| Enterprise value | TRY 42.13 bn | Market value plus TRY 5.51 bn net financial debt. |
| EV/EBITDA | 34.6x | 2025 operating loss plus TRY 1.31 bn depreciation/amortization gives roughly TRY 1.22 bn EBITDA. |
| Market value / total equity | 1.48x | The stock trades above TRY 24.77 bn total equity. |
| Residual EV after port value | TRY 37.75 bn | If the port's 2025 operating profit is valued at 8x, the remainder is loss-making core operations and asset optionality. |
The bull case deserves its due. Batıçim is not an empty signboard. Property, plant and equipment are 27.53 billion TL; land and plots are carried at 12.62 billion TL, and machinery/plant/equipment at 6.79 billion TL fair value. The annual report says the EIA process for the clinker grinding and packaging facility in Aliağa, with annual capacity of 3.5 million tons, concluded positively; the first phase, with 1.75 million tons/year capacity, is expected to contribute to logistics and exports thanks to its location near the port. The alternative fuel ratio rose from 0.9% in 2023 to 14.5% in 2025; recovered energy from waste heat supplied 15.6% of electricity consumption. These are real advances.
But a good investment is not merely a good asset. For Batıçim to be called cheap, three things must be visible at the same time: a return to operating profit on the kiln side, a decline in the net foreign-currency liability, and the conversion of Aliağa and export growth into margin. The company’s application to convert its Batısöke shares into exchange-traded status should also be watched; the proceeds are said to be intended for financial liabilities and renewable investments. A sale that reduces debt and does not damage minority value would be positive. A forced sale at a weak price would be the opposite.
This is not a stock for the impatient “cement will recover” investor. Buying Batıçim means buying not current earnings, but the belief that the asset base will turn into profit in the future. That can only be done if the price gives you a margin for error. When the year-end 2025 books and the May 2026 market value are read together, that margin is not visible.
Verdict: Expensive. At Batıçim, the port is making money and the kiln is not yet convincing; today’s share price behaves as if both were working at once.