Çan2’s story first sounds like industrial romance: domestic coal in Çanakkale, a 340 MWm / 330 MWe power plant, turbine, generator and boiler components brought during the investment period from Graz, Austria, after having already run for roughly 80,000 hours. The machine does work. In the first quarter of 2026, net generation was 476 GWh; a year earlier, the same figure was 263 GWh.
But a stock does not look at romance. It looks at what remains. In the same quarter, Çan2 booked 1.86 billion TL in revenue and reported a 59.4 million TL gross loss. The question is not whether the company produces electricity. The question is what that electricity leaves for the shareholder.
That is why the first mistake in looking at CANTE is the sentence “it trades at half book value.” True, in the market data dated 18 May 2026, the company’s market value is approximately 15.66 billion TL; equity attributable to the parent is 31.31 billion TL. The multiple is roughly 0.50x. But that discount is not, by itself, an opportunity. Sometimes the market is not selling the book cheaply; it is marking down the book’s examination in advance.
The Plant Works, the Margin Does Not
The income statement shows improvement on the volume side. Revenue rose from 1.28 billion TL in 1Q25 to 1.86 billion TL in 1Q26. The jump in net generation was sharper still: from 263 GWh to 476 GWh. Normally, such a table would excite an investor looking for operating leverage.
But the cost line cuts off the excitement. Cost of sales was 1.92 billion TL; inside it were 904.2 million TL of raw material and consumable usage, 398.4 million TL of depreciation, 321.1 million TL of TEİAŞ/EPİAŞ/energy expenses, and 175.9 million TL of personnel expense allocation. The gross loss is born here. The company sells electricity; but under 1Q conditions, the electricity sale price was not enough to carry the fuel, grid, depreciation and personnel burden.
| Item | 1Q26 | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | TRY 1,861.0m | Volume and price lifted revenue. |
| Cost of sales | TRY -1,920.4m | Cost exceeded revenue. |
| Gross profit / loss | TRY -59.4m | Higher generation did not become gross profit. |
| Operating profit / loss | TRY -285.9m | The loss deepened at operating level. |
| D&A | TRY 813.0m | EBITDA looks positive, but cash proof is weak. |
| Operating cash flow | TRY -1,413.4m | The cash-quality test failed. |
Operating loss was 285.9 million TL. Because depreciation and amortization were 813.0 million TL, roughly calculated EBITDA appears positive at 527.1 million TL. This number matters, because it says the plant is not an entirely stalled asset. But it is not sufficient on its own. In the same period, cash flow from operating activities was negative 1.41 billion TL.
The growth of the cash balance should not be misread for the same reason. Period-end cash rose to 2.15 billion TL; but financing activities recorded 3.08 billion TL of inflow, and 3.02 billion TL of that came from share issuance. Çan2 filled the cash box in 1Q not from the plant, but from capital.
What Does Half Book Value Buy?
Çan2’s balance sheet is reassuring at first glance. Short-term financial debt is 678.4 million TL, long-term financial debt is 6.5 million TL. Cash is 2.15 billion TL. Net cash is roughly 1.47 billion TL. For a company carrying 24.97 billion TL of property, plant and equipment, there is no classic debt wall.
But as the balance sheet looks cleaner, other questions become sharper. A significant portion of the 1.68 billion TL in long-term trade receivables comes from Denarius Pumping Services LLC; the footnote states the receivable from PDVSA as 35.87 million dollars, of which 24.80 million dollars is principal and 11.07 million dollars is interest. This cannot be read like an ordinary customer receivable for a power producer. Venezuela risk enters the discount rate quietly.
The related-party picture also leaves a small but watchable line: other receivables from related parties are 70.9 million TL, other payables to related parties are 97.0 million TL. The total of guarantees, pledges and mortgages given is 675.0 million TL. The short-term provision set aside for lawsuits against the company is small at 3.5 million TL; but the fact that the case opened against EPDK and EPİAŞ is under review at the Council of State reminds us that this company cannot be read only through coal and PTF. These items are not large enough to sink the company; but they are real enough to make the quality of the book questionable in the “half book value” debate.
| Bridge | Calculation | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Market value / parent equity | TRY 15.66bn / TRY 31.31bn | 0.50x |
| Net cash | TRY 2.15bn cash - TRY 0.68bn financial debt | TRY 1.47bn |
| Enterprise value | TRY 15.66bn market value - TRY 1.47bn net cash | TRY 14.19bn |
| Annualized Q1 EBITDA | (TRY -285.9m operating loss + TRY 813.0m D&A) x 4 | TRY 2.11bn |
| EV / annualized Q1 EBITDA | TRY 14.19bn / TRY 2.11bn | 6.7x |
| EV / property, plant and equipment | TRY 14.19bn / TRY 24.97bn | 0.57x |
Looking through multiples, the picture splits in two. Market value / equity attributable to the parent is roughly 0.50x. That looks cheap. Enterprise value after deducting net cash is approximately 14.19 billion TL; annualized 1Q EBITDA comes to roughly 2.11 billion TL, and EV/EBITDA is about 6.7x. This does not mean “the market is pricing nothing.” The market is discounting the asset, but it is not completely zeroing the possibility of recovery.
The second company-specific bridge is more naked: net enterprise value is about 57% of the 24.97 billion TL in property, plant and equipment. In other words, the market is not buying the plant at its book value; but it is not leaving it at scrap price either. This middle ground is the real reason for the decision: CANTE looks cheap, but it has not yet produced the cash evidence that justifies its cheapness.
The Evidence Cheapness Requires
Çan2’s road upward is clear. Production has already recovered. If the margin between PTF and fuel cost turns in its favor, gross profit turns positive, and operating cash flow moves into positive territory in 2Q-3Q, then 0.50x book value becomes a very harsh discount. If collection from the PDVSA receivable or a risk-reducing disclosure arrives, balance sheet quality also improves. Then the market may be forced to take back the book discount it is assigning today.
The anti-thesis should also be fair: inside the 1Q net loss, there is 651.6 million TL of deferred tax expense and 185.6 million TL of net monetary position loss. These do not describe operational reality one-for-one. The plant is not suffocating under debt. Production has nearly doubled. This stock can shed the “dead asset” label quickly in a single good margin quarter.
But an investment decision is made with today’s evidence. Today’s evidence is negative gross profit, negative operating profit and negative operating cash despite high production.
Verdict
My verdict for CANTE: fairly valued.
This does not mean the company is worthless. On the contrary, the asset base is large, the debt burden is low, there is net cash, and production has recovered. But the 15.66 billion TL market value today contains not only fear, but also the recovery option. A price at half book value is sufficiently harsh after a quarter that could not produce gross profit; but it is not yet obvious cheapness.
This is a stock for the investor who wants to believe not in the plant’s ability to run, but in whom it leaves money for while running. It is not for the investor who sees only the book discount and does not wait for cash evidence. To own it is to put money on the idea that 476 GWh of generation will one day turn into gross profit in the ledger.