CCOLA’s red crate is read not on the shelf, but at the border gate. The same crate is valued by pricing timing in Turkey, by volume in Kazakhstan, by speed in Uzbekistan, by competition in Pakistan, and by security headlines in Iraq. In the first three months of 2026, the company sold 414 million unit cases; 68.7% of volume came from international operations. This is not only a beverage company. It is a production, distribution, cooler, and collection system operating in difficult countries.
The brand is bright. The ledger is more earthly. In 1Q26, revenue was 52.4 billion TL, EBITDA was 9.3 billion TL, and net income attributable to the parent was 5.2 billion TL. Net debt/EBITDA fell to 0.66x. Yet in the same income statement there is a 3.1 billion TL monetary gain, in the same cash flow there is a 3.998 billion TL working capital outflow, and a 10.816 billion TL increase in trade receivables. The bottle has been sold; the money moves more slowly than the bottle.
The market’s question is this: is the passport discount a justified capital penalty, or has it pressed too hard on a quality route? At the 81.15 TL price dated 18 May 2026, market value is 227.1 billion TL. Add 26.2 billion TL of net debt and enterprise value comes to roughly 253.3 billion TL. But because EBITDA is consolidated, you cannot forget the 12.0 billion TL minority interest on the books; for the parent shareholder, that amount must be deducted from the value bridge. Viewed this way, adjusted enterprise value is about 265.3 billion TL, and the multiple rises from 6.8x to roughly 7.1x on a simple annualization of first-quarter EBITDA. That is still not expensive for a system with falling debt, growing volume, and pricing power; the cheapness margin is simply not as wide as it looks at first glance.
| Segment | Sales volume | EBITDA |
|---|---|---|
| Turkey | 130 million unit cases | TRY 6.162bn |
| International | 284 million unit cases | TRY 7.145bn |
The crate’s real weight is not in Turkey. Turkey grew 1.4% with 130 million unit cases. International operations grew 9.6% with 284 million unit cases. Kazakhstan rose 11.0%, Uzbekistan 40.7%, Pakistan 0.2%; Iraq contracted 1.8% after eleven quarters of growth, under political, security, and economic pressure. In one sentence you see both the promise and the penalty: the growth map is wide, and the map is heavily scratched.
Turkey almost looks too beautiful in the first quarter. Revenue was 20.4 billion TL, EBITDA was 6.2 billion TL, and the EBITDA margin was 30.2%. But in the company’s own breakdown, Turkey EBITDA “excluding other income/expense” was 1.923 billion TL. This is not bad news; it is a warning sign placed there so the headline does not become too seductive. The Turkey story is less a one-quarter profit show than the deliberate optimization of the water category, the rise of the small-package share to 29.6%, the strengthening of the immediate consumption channel, and the fast growth of higher value-added products such as Monster.
The international side is less theatrical, more central. Revenue was 31.9 billion TL, EBITDA was 7.1 billion TL, and the EBITDA margin was 22.4%. EBITDA excluding other income/expense was 6.669 billion TL. There is no margin leap as shiny as Turkey’s; but the volume, geographic diversity, and Central Asian momentum are cleaner. CCOLA’s true passport is here.
Management’s 2026 promise accepts this too: mid-single-digit consolidated volume growth, low-to-mid-single-digit growth in Turkey, high-single-digit growth in international operations, flat EBIT margin under TMS 29, and high-single-digit capex/sales. The first quarter sits on the upper side of that promise: consolidated volume at 6.9%, international volume at 9.6%, and reported EBIT margin at 13.2%, far above last year’s 7.9%. But the company also says in the same report that the timing benefit in capex is expected to balance out over the full year. The first quarter is not the year.
| Item | 1Q26 | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Net income attributable to parent | TRY 5.237bn | Headline profit is strong |
| Monetary gain | TRY 3.130bn | TMS 29 brightens earnings |
| Net income excluding TMS 29 | TRY 3.694bn | Recovery remains, but below the headline |
| Operating cash flow | TRY 4.470bn | Profit has cash support |
| Free cash flow | TRY 462m | Working capital limits conversion |
| Working-capital change | TRY -3.998bn | Collections and inventory need monitoring |
Once the accounting fog is separated, the picture becomes more honest. In the TMS 29-applied report, net income attributable to the parent was 5.237 billion TL. In the same income statement, monetary gain was 3.130 billion TL. In the unaudited statements excluding inflation accounting, net income was 3.694 billion TL. This is still a strong recovery; but the sentence “profit tripled” is not enough evidence on its own. Free cash flow was 462 million TL. Being positive in the first quarter is good; being weak relative to net income puts collections and working capital at the center of the thesis.
The path of capital loss runs through here. The first risk is geography: Iraq’s 1.8% contraction may look small, but the cause is political and security pressure. The second risk is currency and funding: 59% of financial debt is in US dollars, 5% in euros; the net foreign currency position including hedges is -11.3 billion TL. The third risk is the franchise and related-party network: purchases and other expenses from The Coca-Cola Company companies were 10.351 billion TL, payables to this group were 15.308 billion TL; most bottling and distribution agreements with TCCC/TCCEC extend to 2028. This route is strong, but it is no one’s fully independent route.
| Risk area | Sourced datapoint | Meaning for the equity |
|---|---|---|
| Geography | Iraq volume contracted 1.8% | Security and political pressure can cut the growth route |
| FX | Financial debt is 59% US dollar and 5% euro | Lira depreciation and funding costs can move earnings |
| Net FX position | TRY -11.3bn including hedges | There is protection, but not a fully closed position |
| Related parties | Payables to The Coca-Cola Company companies were TRY 15.308bn | The franchise and supply network is not independent |
| Tax/legal | An Uzbekistan tax, penalty and interest amount of about USD 25m was paid and litigation continues | The geography's footnote bill needs monitoring |
The legal picture is not large enough for now to choke the company, but geography’s bill is visible in the footnotes as well. Commercial lawsuits in Turkey stand at 60.8 million TL. At the Uzbekistan subsidiary, the tax, penalty, and interest amount calculated in 2025, equivalent to roughly 25 million US dollars, was paid on 5 January 2026; the company has gone to court and expects a favorable outcome. On the Pakistan side, the report states that if lawsuits are concluded against the company, a 120.7 million TL tax liability may arise. These do not break today’s ledger; but they do break the comfort of saying “it only sells cola.”
Still, these risks are not being ignored at today’s price. The market is not giving CCOLA the multiple of a sterile branded company. It is saying something closer to this: “With this many countries, this many currencies, and this much inflation accounting, I will call you quality, but I will not call you premium.” My objection begins there. With net debt/EBITDA down to 0.66x, 2026-maturity debt at 32% of total debt, and net finance expense reduced from 3.236 billion TL to 1.748 billion TL in 1Q26, the balance sheet is not behaving like a fragile growth story.
| Approach | Input | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Market enterprise value | TRY 227.1bn market value + TRY 26.2bn net debt | TRY 253.3bn EV before minority interest |
| Minority-interest adjustment | Add TRY 12.0bn minority interest against consolidated EBITDA | Adjusted EV about TRY 265.3bn |
| EV/EBITDA | TRY 9.342bn 1Q26 EBITDA x 4 = TRY 37.4bn | About 6.8x; about 7.1x after minority interest |
| 8x EBITDA scenario | TRY 37.4bn annualized EBITDA x 8 - TRY 26.2bn net debt - TRY 12.0bn minority interest | About TRY 260.7bn parent-equity value |
| Segment base case | Turkey EBITDA excluding other income/expense at 6x; international at 8x; less net debt and minority interest | About TRY 221.3bn |
| Segment upside case | Turkey at 7x; international at 9x; less net debt and minority interest | About TRY 255.7bn |
The first valuation approach is simple, but it must have two steps. Divide 253.3 billion TL of enterprise value by annualized TMS 29 EBITDA of 37.4 billion TL and you get roughly 6.8x enterprise value/EBITDA. If we are looking at consolidated EBITDA from the perspective of the parent shareholder, the 12.0 billion TL minority interest must also be placed into the bridge; the adjusted multiple is about 7.1x. A still modest multiple such as 8.0x gives 298.9 billion TL of enterprise value on the same EBITDA; after deducting net debt and minority interest, it falls to roughly 260.7 billion TL of equity value for the parent. That is above today’s market value, but it is no longer “very wide”; it tells a disciplined and measured upside story.
The second approach should separate the company’s two bodies. Annualizing Turkey’s reported EBITDA as it stands would mislead; so I use EBITDA excluding other income/expense. Turkey is 1.923 billion TL, international operations are 6.669 billion TL. Annualize these, apply 6x to Turkey and 8x to the international business, then deduct net debt and minority interest, and the parent value comes to roughly 221 billion TL; below today’s market value. With the same method, if Turkey is valued at 7x and international at 9x, value rises to about 256 billion TL. What makes the stock cheap is not only a multiple game; if risk normalizes there is upside, but if you exaggerate the Turkey quarter or ignore minority interest, the valuation swells immediately.
The counterargument deserves respect. Turkey’s margin may normalize through the rest of the year. Late-2025 pricing, hedge and pre-buy effects, the low base, other income, capex timing, and the TMS 29 monetary gain may make the first quarter look smoother than it really is. Minority interest is another brake: one cannot behave as if all consolidated EBITDA belongs to the parent shareholder. If international volume falls below high single digits, receivables grow faster than sales, and net debt/EBITDA climbs back above 1.2x, today’s low multiple becomes a trap.
But the evidence in hand forces a more balanced conclusion. CCOLA is not buying growth with high debt; it is growing while reducing debt. It uses brand power not in one country, but on the shelves and in the coolers of 12 countries. The profit jump in Turkey is partly dirty; international volume and low leverage are cleaner. Minority interest trims the cheapness margin, but it does not reverse the thesis. This distinction does not make the stock risk-free. At today’s price, it still makes it a quality machine that has been punished too much.
Verdict: Cheap. This stock is not for the investor who wants risk-free consumer defensiveness; it is for the investor who can endure geographic noise and check every quarter whether the crate is truly turning. To own CCOLA is not to buy the Coca-Cola brand. It is to buy the stamps in the red crate’s passport.