Europen’s new story shines in Kütahya Altıntaş; its collateral sits on Eskişehir 75. Yıl OSB. The annual report says the solar glass facility began production on May 26, 2025. So there is no comparison with last year. But there is a first large number: by the end of March 2026, 3,315,818 square meters of solar panel glass had been sold.
The question is this: does that light leave enough profit to carry the mortgage in Eskişehir and the thinning margin in the income statement?
Because the same report holds a colder picture. Revenue rose from 1.64 billion TL to 2.29 billion TL; gross profit fell from 333 million TL to 283 million TL. In management’s ratio table, gross margin drops from 20% to 12%, and operating margin from 24% to 5%. Europen sold more glass; the factory kept a smaller share of the sale for itself.
Reading Europen only as a “PVC profile company” is now incomplete. It has six production facilities in Eskişehir: PVC profile, doors and windows, refrigerator glass, furniture glass, cooker group glass, custom-size doors and windows, and insulated glass. In Kütahya, there is a solar glass production facility with 58,799 m2 of indoor area and 238,908 m2 of total area. The company has no subsidiaries; this is not a holding scaffold, but a single-company balance sheet.
Control, though it may look dispersed, gathers at the head of the table. As of March 31, 2026, İdris Nebi Hatipoğlu’s total stake is 27.44%, Tuğba Öztürk’s stake is 18.37%, and Merve Öztürk and Elif Nazlı Öztürk each hold 2.37%; the free float is 49.45%. Class A shares carry board nomination and voting privileges, while Class B shares carry voting privileges. The free float is high; the steering wheel is privileged.
That is not a disgrace by itself. A family-controlled industrial company can carry long investment patience. The issue at Europen is the price of that patience. Against the 500 million TL loan signed with the Development and Investment Bank of Türkiye on June 12, 2023, with a 2-year grace period and 10-year maturity for the solar glass investment, a 3.0 billion TL mortgage was granted in favor of the bank over the factories in Eskişehir. The Kütahya investment has been completed; title transfer from Zafer Altıntaş OSB is awaited. After the title transfer, the existing mortgages are expected to be released and a mortgage over the new facility is expected to be granted.
| Item | Number | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Solar panel glass sales | 3,315,818 sqm | The new plant is no longer small in the revenue story. |
| Solar loan | TRY 500m | Investment financing with a 2-year grace period and 10-year maturity. |
| Mortgage | TRY 3.0bn | Eskisehir factories remain collateral until the Kutahya title transfer. |
| Property, plant and equipment | TRY 9.74bn | The main body of book value is plant and machinery. |
| Related-party trade receivables | TRY 1.39bn | About 58% of total trade receivables. |
The income statement does not allow this story to be romanticized too quickly. Q1 net profit is 102.8 million TL. But pre-tax profit is only 44.3 million TL. The item that lets net profit exceed pre-tax profit is 61.3 million TL of deferred tax income; the same table also contains a 74.1 million TL net monetary position loss. So the sentence “the company made 102.8 million TL profit” is true but incomplete. The more honest sentence is this: the company booked profit and generated cash, but clean operating earnings do not yet carry the weight of the growth story.
Cash flow is not written for the bear here; that is good news. Cash flow from operations was positive 218.2 million TL in Q1 2026. A year earlier, the same line was negative 429.7 million TL. A 166.7 million TL release in inventories helped cash; a 207.8 million TL increase in trade receivables worked in the opposite direction. There is cash, but the real test of cash quality sits in the balance sheet: of 2.40 billion TL in trade receivables, 1.39 billion TL comes from related parties. That is roughly 58% of total trade receivables.
In Europen, the investor has to look not only at margin, but also at who the collection is from. Related-party receivables may be part of ordinary trade. But when the privileged share structure, family control, and thinning margin enter the same frame, this line becomes the simplest test of capital allocation: are the sales real, is collection disciplined, and is the public shareholder protected at the same pace?
Valuation opens two separate doors here.
The first door is book value. According to market data on May 18, 2026, the share price is 4.89 TL and market capitalization is about 10.27 billion TL. March 31, 2026 equity is 11.36 billion TL. The market prices Europen at roughly 0.90 times book value. For an asset-heavy industrial company in Türkiye, this is a discount worth taking seriously.
But book is not cash in the till. Inside the book are 9.74 billion TL of tangible fixed assets, 399 million TL of investment property, 1.87 billion TL of tangible fixed asset revaluation surplus, and its -350 million TL deferred tax effect. So book cheapness is an invitation; it is not a verdict.
The second door is earnings power. Financial debt is about 2.25 billion TL. Cash and financial investments total about 1.07 billion TL. After deducting these, net financial debt is about 1.19 billion TL, and enterprise value is about 11.45 billion TL. When 89.5 million TL of depreciation is added to Q1 operating profit, rough quarterly EBITDA is 202.3 million TL; annualized, 809.3 million TL. At this pace, EV/EBITDA is about 14.2x. In other words, if the Q1 margin is permanent, the stock is not cheap.
For the market to return to what may be considered a more reasonable industrial multiple of 8.0x EV/EBITDA, annual EBITDA needs to be about 1.43 billion TL. On annualized Q1 revenue, that implies an EBITDA margin of roughly 15.7%. Q1’s rough EBITDA margin is about 8.9%. So the market discounts the book, but what it is really asking is this: will solar glass and the old products together produce double-digit earnings margins again?
| Test | Calculation | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Book value | TRY 10.27bn market value / TRY 11.36bn equity = about 0.90x P/B | There is an asset discount, but the book is plant-heavy. |
| Annualized Q1 earnings | TRY 102.8m x 4 = TRY 411.3m; about 25.0x P/E | The current quarter's profit alone is not cheap. |
| Annualized Q1 EBITDA | EV about TRY 11.45bn / TRY 809.3m = about 14.2x EV/EBITDA | If margin stays near 12%, the discount disappears. |
| EBITDA the market needs | At 8.0x EV/EBITDA, EBITDA needs to be about TRY 1.43bn | That means about a 15.7% EBITDA margin on annualized Q1 revenue. |
Stressing book value leads to the same place. Applying an analytical 25% discount to related-party receivables brings equity down to 11.01 billion TL; market value is still 0.93 times that adjusted book. Add another 20% discount to the net revaluation reserve, and adjusted equity becomes about 10.71 billion TL; market value rises to 0.96 times that. The cheapness does not disappear entirely, but it narrows. That points to the right question: EUREN is cheap because its assets are not worthless; its cheapness is thin because the earnings proof of those assets is still weak.
| Scenario | Adjusted equity | Market value / adjusted equity |
|---|---|---|
| Reported equity | TRY 11.36bn | 0.90x |
| 25% haircut to related-party receivables | TRY 11.01bn | 0.93x |
| Plus 20% haircut to net revaluation reserve | TRY 10.71bn | 0.96x |
The anti-thesis is strong. In Q1, PVC profile sales fell from 1,680 tons to 1,602 tons. Refrigerator glass fell from 650,919 m2 to 370,665 m2. Doors and windows rose from 164,027 units to 202,226 units, cooker glass increased slightly, but the new big volume comes from solar glass. If solar glass is a low-margin volume game, Europen’s market discount is justified. If related-party receivables do not unwind, gross margin stays around 12%, and the mortgage/title transfer process drags on, this stock becomes not “cheap book” but a “waiting room.”
Yet the same evidence table does not silence the bull case either. Q1 coincides with the early period of the new facility. Revenue grew 39%. Operating cash turned positive. Financial debt declined compared with year-end 2025. Equity is higher than market value. If gross margin recovers from 12% into the 15-17% band, and solar glass produces not only square meters but also gross profit, today’s price looks overly punished.
My verdict is therefore Cheap. Not easily cheap; not simple enough to buy just by looking at book. But if what the market is punishing is not permanent deterioration, but the early margin pain of the new solar glass line, then 0.90x P/B is too pessimistic.
There are three data points to watch. First, gross margin: if it stays around 12% in the second and third quarters, the thesis weakens. Second, related-party trade receivables: if the 1.39 billion TL level does not come down, the cash quality question grows. Third, solar glass economics: square meters are no longer enough; the product’s revenue and margin contribution must become visible.
EUREN is not for the investor looking for a peaceful discount. This is an industrial stock bought below book value, but inside that book sit a new facility, an old factory mortgage, family control, related-party receivables, and a thinning margin. For the patient investor, there is potential; for the impatient investor, every quarterly margin table is an exam.
Final word: becoming a shareholder in Europen today is not merely buying a cheap factory. It is opening a controlled bet that the light in Kütahya will carry the mortgage in Eskişehir and the thin margin in the income statement.