Gübretaş still carries its name in the field. Its valuation now waits at the ore face in Söğüt.
In the 2025 annual report, the company’s Turkey business sold 1,798,969 tons of fertilizer; in the same year, fertilizer produced in its own facilities was 459,706 tons. The difference shows that Gübretaş is not merely a factory, but a broad procurement and distribution channel. That channel matters: it reaches farmers through roughly 2,700 sales points, makes a significant share of sales through Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, and works with warehouses and facilities from Yarımca to İskenderun. But that channel is not what makes the stock expensive today.
The number that makes the stock expensive comes from Söğüt: the domestic mining segment generated 8.76 billion TL of period profit from 12.23 billion TL of sales in 2025. The domestic fertilizer segment, meanwhile, remained at 1.85 billion TL of profit from 40.26 billion TL of sales. Gübretaş’s famous name and the center of gravity in its income statement have parted ways.
| Segment | Profit / loss for the period |
|---|---|
| Domestic mining | TRY 8.76bn |
| Domestic fertilizer | TRY 1.85bn |
| International fertilizer / Razi | TRY -0.62bn |
That separation does not have to be bad news. On the contrary, this is the strongest part of Gübretaş’s return to profit in 2025. Consolidated sales rose to 52.50 billion TL, operating profit to 9.57 billion TL, and net profit attributable to the parent to 5.28 billion TL. Operating activities generated 8.37 billion TL of cash; the accounting profit did not hang in the air.
But cheapness is one thing, a good company another. According to market data dated 21 May 2026, the stock trades at 527.50 TL, with the company at roughly 176.19 billion TL in market value. That means about 33.4 P/E on 2025 parent net profit, about 15.7 EV/EBITDA after netting cash and financial debt, and 5.9 P/B on parent equity. These multiples demand more than the sentence “the fertilizer company has recovered.”
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Share price | TRY 527.50 |
| Market value | TRY 176.19bn |
| Parent net profit | TRY 5.28bn |
| P/E | 33.4x |
| EV/EBITDA | 15.7x |
| Market value / parent equity | 5.9x |
On the fertilizer side, the machine is more ordinary and more fragile. According to the 2025 annual report, Turkey’s chemical fertilizer market fell to 6.2 million tons, contracting 5.8% from the previous year. Ammonia, phosphoric acid, foreign exchange, energy, and farmer income all sit at the same table. The company increased sales volume by 15% in 2025; but this increase came more from procurement and channel strength than from production power. At Yarımca, there was a strike between 3 July and 19 November; after the 140-day stoppage, total production fell 23.9%.
| Measure | Tons |
|---|---|
| Turkey fertilizer production | 459,706 tons |
| Turkey fertilizer sales | 1,798,969 tons |
| Procured fertilizer and raw material | 1,697,074 tons |
That is why Gübretaş’s field side has two faces. The channel is strong, but margins are exposed to commodity and financing conditions. The company says it procures almost all of its raw material and traded-goods needs from abroad, and that it closely monitors foreign exchange and commodity price risk. The risk note does not decorate the matter: war, geopolitical risk, exchange rates, energy cost, and financing conditions are the main variables for the 2026 sector outlook.
Söğüt is a different ledger. The mining segment made 1.08 billion TL of investment spending in 2025. Advances related to Phase-1 capacity expansion and Phase-2 investments are growing on the balance sheet. After the period, Gübretaş Maden’s proposed 2.0 billion TL profit distribution was approved. These are real upside evidence for the stock. If Söğüt turns 2025 profit from a peak into a lasting step, today’s expensive-looking multiples may soften over time.
But mining profit does not arrive free of charge. In the financial report, the state royalty provision for Gübretaş Maden rose to 1.64 billion TL. If gold price, currency, state royalty, investment schedule, and production continuity do not work at the same time, the growth story the investor is buying quickly turns into multiple pressure.
Then there is Razi. Gübretaş owns a 48.88% stake in Iran’s Razi Petrochemical; because of control at the board level, Razi is treated as a consolidated subsidiary. In 2025, the sale process for Razi was opened, a tender was held, and then the process was terminated by Board decision; even so, the financial report says the intention to sell continues. For that reason, Razi’s assets of 16.23 billion TL and liabilities of 10.09 billion TL were classified as held for sale, and the operation generated a 619 million TL loss.
Razi is not just a line item for sale; it is a risk file. The financial report explains that, in the lawsuit filed against Razi over alleged excess gas consumption, the appellate court upheld a payment of 59.38 million US dollars, that the Group objected, and that it set aside a 20 million US dollar provision. After the period, it was announced that electrical units at Razi’s facilities were damaged because of conflicts in Iran and that production was temporarily halted. The same note says the effect of volatility in the Iranian Rial’s NIMA rate cannot be reliably estimated.
The good side of this file is that the market does not appear to assign much of the company’s value to Razi anyway. The bad side is that while the value of the asset to be sold is not easy to determine, its risk is very concrete.
There is no simple free-float story on Gübretaş’s ownership and governance side either. The Central Union of Turkish Agricultural Credit Cooperatives is the controlling shareholder with a 78.73% stake. In 2025, sales of goods and services to Agricultural Credit Cooperatives amounted to 39.65 billion TL; at year-end, trade receivables from related parties stood at 4.81 billion TL. The financial risk note states plainly that no collateral is received for sales made to the parent shareholder, TKK. This does not mean bad faith; but for the minority investor, it means the channel is both customer and controlling-shareholder ecosystem.
| File | Sourced datapoint |
|---|---|
| Razi | TRY 16.23bn assets held for sale, TRY 10.09bn liabilities; TRY 619mn loss |
| Related-party channel | TRY 39.65bn sales to Tarım Kredi Cooperatives; TRY 4.81bn receivable |
| Mining burden | TRY 1.64bn state-right provision; TRY 1.08bn 2025 mining capex |
| Legal/geopolitical risk | USD 20mn provision for Razi gas lawsuit; post-period Iran production halt and FX uncertainty |
The valuation bridge hardens here. From Gübretaş’s 176.19 billion TL market value, if we assign the domestic fertilizer segment a reasonable, not generous, value of 8 times its 2025 profit, about 14.8 billion TL comes out. If we count Razi at its 6.14 billion TL net asset value without applying any discount, the market appears to be assigning the remaining roughly 155.2 billion TL to Söğüt. That is about 17.7 times 2025 domestic mining profit.
If you mark Razi down to zero, the value loaded onto Söğüt rises further: roughly 161.4 billion TL, or 18.4 times 2025 mining profit. In the other direction, if you give Söğüt 12 times profit, domestic fertilizer 8 times profit, and Razi full net asset value, the total remains around 126 billion TL. A more optimistic 15x mining, 10x fertilizer, and full Razi value comes to roughly 156 billion TL; the current market value is still about 20 billion TL above that. These are not definitive values; they are a sensitivity mirror showing what the market believes.
That is why the fairest anti-thesis is this: 2025 may look expensive in hindsight, but it may still be an early year for Söğüt. If Phase-2 advances, gold price supports the story, state royalty and investment burden stay under control, Razi exits the balance sheet through a clean sale, and the fertilizer channel returns to a more normal production order after the strike, today’s price may be early rather than high.
My objection is not to the quality of the company, but to the order of proof. The market is not pricing the proven 5.28 billion TL of parent net profit; it is pricing a mining scale that still needs to be tested over several more years. The fertilizer business is a strong channel, but low-margin and commodity-dependent. Razi is for sale, but not clean. The Agricultural Credit channel is valuable, but carries related-party concentration. Söğüt is impressive, but today’s price requires it to create a larger future.
This stock is not for the calm investor looking for a balance sheet. It is for the investor who sees Söğüt’s growth, support from gold prices, a resolution of Razi, and the Agricultural Credit channel’s collection/collateral risk as manageable. The data that would change my view is clear: if I see mining profit settle into a 15-16 billion TL annual run-rate after state royalty, or if Razi exits through a clean and valuable transaction, the verdict changes.
Today’s verdict: Expensive.
To become a shareholder in Gübretaş today is not to pay for the fertilizer company in the field, but to pay upfront for Söğüt’s future profit, not yet fully proven.