In Hektaş’s report, the factories speak first. The plant protection line in Gebze, Ferbis in Niğde, organomineral fertilizer in Adana, liquid and microbial fertilizer in Ankara, seed in Antalya. Gebze runs at 72% capacity in the first quarter, Niğde at 80%. This is the scene one expects from an agricultural inputs company: factory, dealer, farmer, season.
Then the income statement places a sharper instrument in the middle of that scene. Hektaş produced 368.8 million TL in gross profit in the first quarter of 2026. In the same period, financing expense was 831.4 million TL. Before the harvest reached the cash box, interest had entered the field.
That is why calling Hektaş merely an “agricultural inputs company” is incomplete. The company is in plant protection, plant nutrition and seeds; OYAK is the controlling shareholder with a 55.37% stake; the product portfolio and facility map are real. But the stock’s present issue is not the existence of capacity. It is the financing cost at which that capacity turns into sales.
The improvement versus the first quarter of 2025 is undeniable. While sales fell from 2.73 billion TL to 2.22 billion TL, a gross loss of 56.8 million TL turned into 368.8 million TL of gross profit. Operating loss narrowed from 666.4 million TL to 294.7 million TL. The interim activity report’s EBITDA calculation moved from minus 355.1 million TL to plus 46.6 million TL. This is the most honest part of the bull thesis: operationally, Hektaş has recovered from a very bad first quarter of 2025.
But the market value is not pricing the start of a recovery. It is pricing recovery as if it has already been won. In the price context of 18 May 2026, the company has a market value of roughly 34.90 billion TL. Total financial debt and lease liabilities stand at 10.85 billion TL; after deducting cash and financial investments, net debt is about 8.54 billion TL. Enterprise value therefore rises to 43.44 billion TL.
| Item | Amount / ratio | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 34.90bn | 18 May 2026 price context |
| Parent equity | TRY 14.93bn | Market value / parent equity about 2.34x |
| Net debt | TRY 8.54bn | Financial debt less cash and financial investments |
| Enterprise value | TRY 43.44bn | Market value plus net debt |
| Q1 EBITDA | TRY 46.6m | Current-quarter earnings do not support the enterprise value |
| Annualized Q1 EBITDA | TRY 186.3m | Enterprise value / annualized EBITDA about 233x |
That value is not buying 46.6 million TL of quarterly EBITDA; it is buying a very different future profitability regime. Annualizing Q1 EBITDA gives 186 million TL, which is almost decorative beside enterprise value. To carry today’s value at a more reasonable 12x EV/EBITDA level, Hektaş would need to produce roughly 3.62 billion TL in sustainable annual EBITDA. That implies a 40.7% EBITDA margin on annualized Q1 sales. In the agricultural inputs business, this is not a “small recovery.” It requires a different quality of enterprise.
| Target enterprise value / EBITDA | Required annual EBITDA | EBITDA margin on annualized Q1 sales |
|---|---|---|
| 10x | TRY 4.34bn | 48.9% |
| 12x | TRY 3.62bn | 40.7% |
| 15x | TRY 2.90bn | 32.6% |
Book value sends the same message. Equity attributable to the parent is 14.93 billion TL; market value is about 2.34 times that. For a company still making losses, still negative in operating cash flow, and with financing expense more than twice gross profit, this multiple is not cheapness. It is a prepaid advance on improvement.
The most deceptive line is the 925.5 million TL net monetary gain. Inflation accounting is a reporting reality in Turkey; dismissing it as “fake” is too easy. But the investor must separate one thing: monetary gain is not operating cash entering the till. A quarter with 831 million TL of financing expense, a 297 million TL operating loss before financing expense, and 150 million TL in deferred tax expense closed with a 257.9 million TL loss despite the net monetary gain.
Cash flow makes this distinction more brutally. Cash flow from operating activities is minus 260.2 million TL. The real support on the cash side is the 1.08 billion TL of investment cash from the entry of a new partner into Hektaş Asia. This is not a bad thing; bringing outside capital into the Uzbekistan investment opens room on the balance sheet. But it does not show that the core business is funding its own bill through its own collections.
The activity report does not hide the maturity pressure either. In the plant protection segment, in parallel with competitors’ low-price and long-maturity sales strategies, Hektaş used price and maturity flexibility; average sales maturities increased compared with the same period last year. The same section records high loan rates, difficulty accessing financing, and rising collection risk across the sector. In plant nutrition, by contrast, the company acted more cautiously with short maturities and cash/credit-card installment sales. In other words, the issue is not one product group. It is the payment calendar of the trade.
That is why the debt calendar is the report’s second main character. Short-term financial debt and lease liabilities are roughly 9.01 billion TL; current assets are 7.25 billion TL. The gap between total short-term liabilities and current assets is 5.19 billion TL. The company’s approval for a bond/commercial paper issuance ceiling of up to 15 billion TL should be read in this context: Hektaş’s story is as much a refinancing story as a growth story.
Foreign exchange risk is not a passive footnote either. As of 31 March 2026, the Group carries a 4.64 billion TL net foreign currency liability position. The total sensitivity to a 10% move in the US dollar, euro and CNY is 463.8 million TL. This is not a small volatility item beside gross profit; it is large enough to change a quarter’s investment thesis.
On related parties, the picture is calmer but not irrelevant. There are commercial and financing relationships with OYAK and companies managed by OYAK. Short-term other payables to related parties are 985.1 million TL, and long-term other payables are 174.8 million TL. The interest rate on short-term financing-related related party debt is in the 40%-45% range. The presence of the controlling group is an advantage for financing access; the same presence obliges minority investors to watch price, maturity and capital structure decisions closely.
The governance paragraph hardens here. During the period, the process began to raise the registered capital ceiling from 8.5 billion TL to 25 billion TL. At OYAK’s request, the agenda included dividing the capital into A and B group shares, granting A group shares privileges such as nominating board candidates, electing the chair and deputy chair, representation and binding authority, and 5 voting rights per share at the general assembly. This structure may look understandable for management stability. For minority investors, it turns the word “financing option” into a cost that must be watched carefully.
The bull thesis still does not leave the table. Gebze and Niğde capacity utilization is high. Since Adana is at 42% and Ankara at 13% utilization, there is operational leverage inside the system that can still be activated. The seed side reaching 39 registered varieties, the R&D center certificate for the Ankara High Technology Center, the entry of an outside partner into Hektaş Asia, and OYAK control separate the company from an ordinary weak-balance-sheet story.
The path to cheapness runs through this point: gross margin must remain in the mid-teens, sales must start growing again, receivables must not swell faster than sales, operating cash flow must turn positive, and financing expense must fall below gross profit. If these five conditions appear together, today’s price may look early but not foolish. If Hektaş turns into a high-scale, cash-generating agricultural inputs platform, a 43 billion TL enterprise value becomes discussable.
Today’s file does not prove that. Today’s file opens the door to a turn and, at the same time, places interest, maturity, currency risk and control privilege in front of that door.
The fair anti-thesis is this: compared with the first quarter of 2025, the picture has clearly improved. Gross margin has moved from minus 2.1% to plus 16.6%, and EBITDA margin from minus 13.0% to plus 2.1%. Inventories have fallen from 2.73 billion TL to 2.13 billion TL. If this is the first quarter of an exit from the bottom, punishing the company by looking only at the Q1 loss would be wrong.
My objection is not punishment. It is price. A 34.90 billion TL market value looks expensive against 14.93 billion TL of parent-company equity, because that equity is currently producing losses. Enterprise value is not supportable against annualized Q1 EBITDA, because the market is buying not current EBITDA but the option of recovery. The option has value, but at Hektaş its price already appears to have been collected.
That is why my verdict is clear: with this file, Hektaş is Expensive. I do not call it “Troubled,” because the asset base, OYAK control, capacity and product portfolio are real strengths holding the company upright. I do not call it “Fairly Valued,” because the market is assigning value too early to a turnaround not yet proven by cash. I do not call it “Cheap,” because while 831 million TL of financing expense sits on top of 369 million TL of gross profit, cheapness can only be defended by proof from future quarters.
The next file has a simple checklist: has operating cash flow turned positive, have receivables stopped growing faster than sales, has financing expense fallen below gross profit, and was the capital move carried out without bruising minorities? If the answers to these four questions change, the view changes.
Hektaş stock today does not look like a stake in agricultural growth. It looks like a stake in the harvest interest reaps first while Gebze keeps working.