The boiler did not stop in Aliağa. İzdemir Enerji’s 370 MW imported coal plant in Horozgediği ran at a 93% capacity utilization rate in the first quarter of 2026; the 143.18 MWe solar plant in Manisa Salihli added 33,745 MWh of production. Sales volume did not collapse: 697,916 MWh of electricity was sold.
But the ledger said something else. From 1.779 billion TL of sales, only 20.7 million TL of gross profit remained. Gross profit per MWh fell from 428 TL in the first quarter of 2025 to 30 TL in the first quarter of 2026. On the same balance sheet, cash fell to 321.2 million TL, while total trade and other receivables from related parties rose to 1.95 billion TL.
To understand this stock, the first place to look is not the chimney, but the spread and the receivables book. The plant is running. The question is whom that running serves, and how much money it leaves behind.
İzdemir Enerji’s public mask is comforting: high current ratio, low leverage, completed solar investment, high capacity utilization. None of these is invented. As of 31 March 2026, the company’s equity was 18.08 billion TL; the ratio of total liabilities to equity was 0.11 in the activity report; the current ratio was 7.58. Financial debt was 1.063 billion TL, while cash and financial investments totaled roughly 741 million TL. Net financial debt was only about 322 million TL.
So calling İzdemir Enerji “distressed” would be wrong. That is the wrong word. The right word is more uncomfortable: expensive recovery.
Running the Boiler Is Not Enough
The company’s business model looks simple: it generates electricity with imported coal and sells that electricity; during downtime, or on top of its own production, it can buy electricity from outside and sell it to customers. At full capacity, the thermal plant consumes 950 thousand to 1 million tons of coal per year and can generate up to 2.841 billion kWh of electricity. On top of that, the Manisa solar investment has an annual production plan of 256.1 million kWh.
These sizes can mislead the investor. Because in an energy company, capacity alone is not profit. İzdemir’s first quarter showed this bluntly. Thermal production fell only 2%, from 672,492 MWh to 662,244 MWh. Solar production rose 5%, from 32,012 MWh to 33,745 MWh. Total sales again fell only 2%, from 712,997 MWh to 697,916 MWh.
The economic result was not as calm as the physical result. Sales revenue fell by about 25% to 1.779 billion TL. Operating profit fell from 250.9 million TL to 16.5 million TL. EBITDA declined from 456.5 million TL to 230.3 million TL. The operating profit margin fell from 10.6% to 0.9%.
| Item | 2025Q1 | 2026Q1 | Read-through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thermal generation | 672,492 MWh | 662,244 MWh | Only 2% lower |
| Solar generation | 32,012 MWh | 33,745 MWh | 5% higher |
| Total sales | 712,997 MWh | 697,916 MWh | 2% lower |
| Revenue | TRY 2,369.6 million | TRY 1,779.4 million | About 25% lower |
| EBITDA | TRY 456.5 million | TRY 230.3 million | 49.6% lower |
| Operating margin | 10.6% | 0.9% | Spread, not volume, broke |
Net loss was 565.2 million TL. There is a heavy accounting burden inside that figure: 453.7 million TL of deferred tax expense and 106.9 million TL of monetary position loss. So it would be hasty to look only at the net loss and say the company is operationally broken. But the gross profit line does not offer the same excuse. Cost of sales was 1.759 billion TL; it consumed almost all of revenue.
That is why the sentence that would make the stock look cheap is not “the plant is running.” The plant is already running. Cheapness comes only if the running plant starts leaving money behind again.
The Family Ledger Beside the Cash
İzdemir Enerji’s control architecture is not at the edge of the investment thesis; it stands at the center. İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. owns 54.32% of the company. İDÇ Liman İşletmeleri A.Ş. carries a 6.48% stake. Two Pardus funds together hold 10.4%. The financial report identifies İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. as the parent shareholder and Şahin Şirketler Grubu Holding A.Ş. as the ultimate controlling shareholder. Group A shares have only 1,000 TL of nominal size, but the power to nominate board candidates sits in those shares.
This structure does not automatically prove anything bad. But when it is combined with the receivables book, the investor has to read it more coldly.
As of 31 March 2026, 1.267 billion TL of trade receivables were from related parties. Of this, 1.261 billion TL came from İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. There was also 685.0 million TL of related-party receivables under other receivables; the financial report also identifies this item as İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. Total related-party receivables of 1.95 billion TL equaled 48.5% of current assets. The same note says there was no allowance for doubtful receivables and no collateralized receivable for related-party receivables.
The risk language in the activity report says the company minimizes credit risk by making sales largely in cash. That sentence is not worthless; it describes collection discipline in the energy market. But when balance-sheet day arrives with 321.2 million TL in cash and 1.95 billion TL in related-party receivables, the investor should listen more to the balance than to the sentence.
| Item | 31 March 2026 | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | TRY 321.2 million | TRY 1,155.2 million lower than the opening cash balance |
| Trade receivables from related parties | TRY 1,267.4 million | 91.7% of total trade receivables |
| Other receivables from related parties | TRY 685.0 million | Shown in the financial report as İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. |
| Total related-party receivables | TRY 1,952.4 million | 48.5% of current assets |
| Operating cash flow | TRY -360.2 million | The loss was not harmless in cash terms |
Cash flow strengthens the same story. There was a 360.2 million TL cash outflow from operating activities. Beginning cash was 1.476 billion TL, while ending cash was 321.2 million TL. Financing activities show a 758.3 million TL cash outflow; inside that, the 685.0 million TL increase in other receivables from related parties is especially important. This does not mean the company is going to fail. But it shows that beneath the low-debt balance-sheet image, money can be parked as intra-group receivables.
The Legal Shadow Is Small Today, Large for the Multiple
The environmental and license heading does not look like a crisis stopping production today. The company says that after the old EIA cancellation process regarding the industrial waste site, it made a new application and received an EIA Positive decision on 6 March 2025. The municipal committee decision subject to İzmir Metropolitan Municipality’s closure action was cancelled in the judicial process; the company says there is currently no obstacle affecting its activities. Production continues without interruption.
But the file is not completely closed. The opposing party’s appeal before the Council of State is pending. This risk does not destroy today’s financials by itself; but it hangs over the multiple for a thermal plant trading at 1.66x book value. In coal plant stocks, legal risk sometimes does not appear as a liability on the balance sheet; it appears as a discount.
Currency risk is also clear and measurable. According to the financial report, as of 31 March 2026 the net foreign-currency liability position was approximately 1.080 billion TL. If the TL loses 10% against foreign currencies, the profit/loss impact is approximately 108.0 million TL negative. This is not a number that would choke the company; but in a quarter with 16.5 million TL of operating profit, it is not small either.
What Is the Price Asking For?
At a share price of 12.25 TL and 2.44375 billion shares, market capitalization is 29.94 billion TL. That means 1.66x P/B for 18.08 billion TL of equity. The market expects the assets on the books not merely to sit there, but to turn into earnings.
The multiple picture is harsher. EBITDA calculated from 2025 annual operating profit and depreciation is approximately 2.305 billion TL. Removing 2025Q1 and adding 2026Q1 brings TTM EBITDA down to approximately 2.079 billion TL. When net financial debt of roughly 322 million TL is added, enterprise value is approximately 30.26 billion TL. That makes 14.6x EV/EBITDA. If 2026Q1 EBITDA conditions are annualized, the multiple rises to 32.9x.
| Measure | Calculation | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 29.94 billion | Based on TRY 12.25 price and 2.44375 billion shares |
| P/B | 1.66x | TRY 29.94 billion market value / TRY 18.08 billion equity |
| Net financial debt | TRY 0.32 billion | TRY 1.063 billion financial debt minus cash and financial investments |
| TTM EBITDA | TRY 2.08 billion | 2025 annual EBITDA minus 2025Q1 EBITDA plus 2026Q1 EBITDA |
| EV/EBITDA | 14.6x | About TRY 30.26 billion EV / TRY 2.08 billion TTM EBITDA |
| If Q1 conditions annualize | 32.9x EV/EBITDA | Based on four times 2026Q1 EBITDA |
The second company-specific lens is simpler: gross profit per MWh. If 2026Q1 sales volume had worked at the 428 TL/MWh gross profit level of 2025Q1, gross profit would have been approximately 298.9 million TL. Actual gross profit was 20.7 million TL. The 278.2 million TL quarterly gap between the two explains why the stock price demands recovery. If that gap closes, equity benefits quickly thanks to low net debt. If it does not, today’s market value remains too generous for a working but low-return asset base.
A simple sensitivity for related-party receivables hardens the picture. Reading the 1.95 billion TL receivable at a 25% discount gives roughly 488 million TL; that is 2.7% of 18.08 billion TL of equity and 1.6% of the 29.94 billion TL market value. This alone does not break the company. But the multiple the market pays wants the receivable to turn into cash, not merely remain on the books.
The fair bull argument begins here. İzdemir Enerji’s balance sheet is not breaking under debt. The company has disclosed no commitments and contingent liabilities. There is no pledge, lien, or mortgage on tangible fixed assets. There are sureties received from shareholders for loans. The solar plant is in operation. The thermal plant is working by volume. A few good spread quarters and receivable collection could make the first-quarter photograph look too dark.
The bear answer is just as clear: a 29.94 billion TL market value is not paying a cheap option price for the sentence “maybe it recovers.” The stock requires Q1 to be temporary. And it requires not only the margin to return, but cash to return as well.
Verdict
The verdict for İzdemir Enerji: Expensive.
This verdict does not mean the company is insolvent. The balance sheet is low-debt, the plant is operating, and the legal headings are not stopping today’s production. But the share price wants more than a low-debt asset base: it is pricing in the recovery of the imported coal-electricity spread, the conversion of related-party receivables into cash, currency risk not eating the margin again, and the Council of State file staying quiet, all at the same time.
This stock is not for the investor looking for short-term balance-sheet panic. It can be a comeback bet for the patient investor willing to follow the spread cycle, the rhythm of intra-group receivables, and thermal plant law. But what is being bought at today’s price is not a “cheap energy asset”; it is an expensive belief that the working boiler in Aliağa will again leave money in the cash box. If high capacity, low gross margin, and uncollected related-party receivables persist together, this verdict gets harder.