There is a solar field of roughly two million square meters in Viranşehir. RALYH does not write this as a dream, but as a 130 MWm/100 MWe license, a plant with Ministry acceptance completed, and full-capacity production-sales. This is one of the most real objects in the company’s story: panel, field, license, electricity.
But in the first quarter of 2026, the stock’s question is not whether the sun exists. The question is this: can the Viranşehir sun, the CentRAL land bank, the Ral GYO dream and the Anadolu Mikronize option turn into enough cash today to carry a 93.5 billion TL market value?
That is why the income statement does not need poetry; it needs bridge arithmetic. RALYH booked 3.576 billion TL in revenue in 2026Q1; gross profit was 248.0 million TL, operating profit 100.2 million TL. On the same table, net profit was 1.491 billion TL. The smell of the gap does not come from the construction site, but from the ledger: 788.6 million TL investment activity income, 19.4 million TL investment activity expense, 619.0 million TL net monetary position gain and 93.6 million TL deferred tax income.
The mask the company presents to the public is broad: construction, renewable energy, industrial minerals and mining. This mask is not entirely false. Ral Yapı, Hera Teknik, Ral GYO and Best Trend are under 100 percent control; Ral Enerji is 51 percent, Astral 85 percent, Anadolu Mikronize 10 percent. The construction past at the management table is strong: Rıza Kandemir and Ahmet Zorlu are both major shareholders and central figures in management; Group A shares carry the privilege to nominate candidates to the board.
The machine is more naked. The body of Q1 revenue comes from construction/project work; cost of sales was 3.328 billion TL. Gross margin was 6.9 percent, EBITDA margin 4.6 percent based on the 165.6 million TL EBITDA in the activity report. The company says it has completed 5,502 residences; 3,619 residences and 117 workplaces/shops continue in cooperation with TOKİ; and 304 residences and 62 workplaces/shops continue on the Ral GYO side. Across the group, that means 3,923 residences and 179 workplaces/shops; construction project size is 15.1 billion TL. When construction and energy are given together, the ongoing project value is above 24 billion TL.
| Item | 2026Q1 |
|---|---|
| Ongoing group housing units | 3,923 |
| Ongoing workplaces/stores | 179 |
| Construction project size | TRY 15.1bn |
| Total ongoing project value | >TRY 24bn |
| Solar capacity in production and sales | 130 MWm |
| Energy project investment amount | USD 250mn |
This is not an empty showcase. A 4.8 billion TL revenue contribution is expected from the CentRAL project in Mustafa Kemal Mahallesi, with approximately 60,000 square meters of construction area. In Çayyolu, a contract has been signed with the Privatization Administration for a 28-decare land parcel; the partnership structure includes Ral GYO, Best Trend and Üçüncü Proje Gayrimenkul Yatırım Fonu. In Samsun Atakum, a 2,621.24 square meter parcel zoned for tourism and commerce was acquired with a 385 million TL tender price; 135 million TL was paid in cash, 250 million TL Ziraat Bankası credit was used, and the property was mortgaged.
The energy side is not a fairy tale either. Viranşehir 4 and 9 solar projects are online. In the energy file, with a total planned investment cost of 250 million US dollars, there is 78 MWm of pre-licensed storage WPP, 20 MWm of storage SPP at application stage, and 130 MWm of SPP that has started production-sales. But here too, the investor must read the second half of the sentence. The EIA application for İscehisar-2 WPP was withdrawn because institutional opinions had not been completed and technical improvements regarding turbine placements were continuing; a new application will be made after amendment work.
The real smell of Q1 is profit quality. From 1.397 billion TL pre-tax profit, subtract 769.2 million TL net investment activity result and 619.0 million TL net monetary position gain, and roughly 8.9 million TL remains. This does not mean “the company is not making money.” There is 990.0 million TL cash flow from operating activities; this is important and should be taken seriously. But in the same quarter, there is 1.217 billion TL cash outflow from investing activities. Of this, 638.2 million TL is the purchase of investment property, and 578.5 million TL is the purchase of tangible and intangible fixed assets. While period-end cash stood at 46.7 million TL, financial debt and other financial liabilities were 3.858 billion TL.
The weight of the balance sheet says the same thing. Of 18.108 billion TL in total assets, 5.058 billion TL is investment property and 8.434 billion TL is tangible fixed assets. Investment properties are carried under the fair value model; inside Q1 investment income, there is a 274.9 million TL valuation difference. The assets on the books may be real; but their value is not the same thing as the price the market is willing to pay.
Governance should be read separately. Rıza Kandemir stands on the table with a total 36.23 percent stake, Ahmet Zorlu with 22.13 percent; Group A shares carry the privilege to nominate candidates to the board. This control structure is not bad by itself. But the related-party note is a meter that minority investors must watch: other receivables from related parties are 642.0 million TL; trade payables to related parties are 99.1 million TL; other payables to related parties are 1.023 billion TL. The activity report also states clearly that no insurance was taken out for damages board members may cause to the company during their duties.
| Gauge | Amount / status |
|---|---|
| Cash and cash equivalents | TRY 46.7mn |
| Financial debt + other financial liabilities | TRY 3.858bn |
| Other receivables from related parties | TRY 642.0mn |
| Trade + other payables to related parties | TRY 1.122bn |
| Letters of guarantee given | TRY 715.1mn |
| Worker lawsuit provisions | TRY 5.8mn |
So what is being priced into the stock? Market data for 18 May 2026 shows a 280.75 TL price and a 93.49 billion TL market value. With 333 million TL paid-in capital, the math holds. This market value is 11.6 times the 8.079 billion TL equity attributable to the parent. If you multiply Q1 parent profit by four, the annual run-rate becomes 4.94 billion TL; the market pays 18.9x price/earnings for that. Even this alone is not “cheap.”
The harsher test is EBITDA. Q1 EBITDA in the activity report is 165.6 million TL; straight annualized, that is 662.4 million TL. When cash and financial investments are deducted from financial debt, roughly 2.664 billion TL net debt remains; added to market value, enterprise value is approximately 96.15 billion TL. This means roughly 145x annualized Q1 EBITDA. That ratio says you are not buying RALYH’s current EBITDA, but the expected future value of energy, land, GYO and IPO optionality.
| Test | Result |
|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 93.49bn |
| Annualized Q1 parent P/E | 18.9x |
| Parent equity multiple | 11.6x |
| EV/EBITDA on annualized Q1 EBITDA | 145.2x |
| Residual expectation after 2x parent book | TRY 77.3bn |
| Market value / disclosed project-value floor | at most 3.9x |
The second company-specific reading is residual value. Since RALYH is not a classic factory, ending the work with only P/E or P/B would be unfair. Suppose you treat parent equity generously and assign it 2x value: 16.2 billion TL. The remainder of today’s market value is still 77.3 billion TL. Even if you give it 3x book value, the residual expectation is 69.3 billion TL. This residual is the upfront price today of 130 MWm solar, the 250 million US dollar energy project file, the 15.1 billion TL construction project size, the possibility of Ral GYO/Anadolu Mikronize IPOs, and the ability to develop land.
Is this price impossible? No. But it has not yet been proven on the source surface. We do not see Viranşehir’s energy revenue and cash as a separate strong line yet. Ral GYO and Anadolu Mikronize IPOs are written as targets; price, timing and value transfer to minorities are not yet in the file. Construction project size describes revenue and investment potential; it is not direct equity value.
The bull case still deserves to be taken seriously. RALYH is not a shell selling empty promises. Viranşehir is online. It says 2025 targets have been reached. JCR Avrasya raised its long-term national rating from BBB+ to A- and left the outlook stable; the rationale includes business diversity, 2025 profitability, strong cash flow and equity structure. If Viranşehir produces regular cash, other plants move through permit processes, CentRAL and Samsun projects are sold at good prices, and a Ral GYO or Anadolu Mikronize IPO creates external value above what is visible on the books, today’s expensive-looking price could turn into an option platform.
But the report’s verdict does not have to pay today’s price for that possibility. In my view, RALYH is Expensive. The expensiveness does not come from the company being fake; it comes from the market loading an unproven victory premium onto real assets. To assign 93.5 billion TL of value to a structure that produces 100 million TL operating profit in one quarter, gets the body of its profit from investment income and TMS 29, carries 3.858 billion TL of financial liabilities, and has related-party balances that must be watched, the future file needs to open very cleanly.
This thesis changes under these conditions: EBITDA margin rises clearly in Q2 and Q3; Viranşehir energy cash appears separately and strongly; related-party receivables decline; Iscehisar/Efkaftepe permit processes advance; a Ral GYO or Anadolu Mikronize IPO crystallizes clear value for minorities. If the opposite happens, if the profit bridge again fills with book gains and project/related-party balances grow, the expensive stock becomes more risky even without getting cheaper.
RALYH is not the stock of a calm dividend investor. This is the stock of the investor willing to pay a high price today for the belief that the Viranşehir sun and Ankara land parcels will one day leave book profit behind and turn into recurring cash.