Reeder’s best scene begins in Samsun, in old tobacco hangars. The financial report says the company leased eight former tobacco hangars inside Samsun University’s Ballıca Campus and converted them into a technology production area. The annual report places a brighter sentence over that scene: management speaks of a dream to produce 20,000 Reev Fancy vehicles per month, selling some in Turkey and some abroad.
The 2025 number is smaller and harsher: 574 vehicles were produced, 518 were delivered. In the same year, remaining cash was 19.2 million TL and net loss was 1.27 billion TL.
So the Reeder question is not whether it can make electric vehicles. The question is whether the story waiting in the old hangar, on the store shelf, and in advances paid to suppliers can turn into cash.
| Year | Sales | Operating profit/loss | Net profit/loss |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | TRY 5.00bn | TRY 2.10bn | TRY 1.72bn |
| 2024 | TRY 3.45bn | TRY 0.64bn | TRY -1.22bn |
| 2025 | TRY 1.81bn | TRY -0.33bn | TRY -1.27bn |
The company’s visible identity is that of a technology brand: smartphone, tablet, robot vacuum, smartwatch, television, computer, electric vehicle. Its sales channel is not just a website; the annual report speaks of 108 ReeDükkan stores. The stores touch the customer, provide technical support, and test the product’s reality in the field. This is not an empty story.
But the 2025 financials lower the price of the story. Revenue fell from 3.45 billion TL in 2024 to 1.81 billion TL in 2025; the decline was 47.6%. Gross margin looks strong on paper, at 47.6%. Yet marketing expenses reached 917.5 million TL, equal to 50.6% of sales. After gross profit, the company’s sales machine could not carry its own weight: operating loss was 334.8 million TL.
Operations were not the only thing enlarging the net loss. Under TAS 29, there was a 787.7 million TL net monetary position loss. Finance expenses were 384.1 million TL, while finance income was 142.1 million TL. Deferred tax income of 76.5 million TL softened the loss somewhat, but did not change the direction. Loss attributable to the parent was 1.02 billion TL.
Cash flow looks better at first glance: operating activities generated 93.2 million TL of cash inflow. But this is not a clean victory. In the same table, cash and cash equivalents fell by 533.7 million TL during the year. Without the 608.9 million TL release from financial investments and the 265.1 million TL tax refund, the cash picture would have looked more exposed. Year-end cash and cash equivalents were 19.2 million TL; short-term liabilities were 1.21 billion TL.
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Cash | TRY 19mn |
| Cash + financial investments | TRY 96mn |
| Current liabilities | TRY 1,206mn |
Reeder’s real balance-sheet sentence is written here: 2.18 billion TL of inventory, 980.8 million TL of short-term prepaid expenses, 186.3 million TL of long-term prepaid expenses. Total: 3.35 billion TL. That is roughly one-third of total assets.
Inventory and advances are not bad words. For a manufacturer, raw materials, finished goods, and order advances can be the fuel of growth. But in technology products, time is the enemy of inventory. In phones, tablets, electronic devices, and light mobility products, models age, prices fall, campaigns become necessary, and warranty burdens emerge. The financial report shows warranty provisions of 65.7 million TL and lawsuit provisions of 28.6 million TL. These amounts will not destroy the company, but they do make one question the cash quality of “book value.”
| Line item | 2025 amount | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Inventories + prepayments | TRY 3.35bn | About 34% of total assets; must convert into products or sales. |
| Reeder Bilisim carrying value | TRY 2.45bn | TRY 1.26mn 2025 profit share; large valuation-dependent asset. |
| Other debt to Uygar Saral | TRY 632.6mn | Related-party liability; capital circulation should be monitored. |
| Total collateral/pledge/mortgage position | TRY 3.04bn | Commitment and relationship network should be read separately from financial debt. |
| Warranty and lawsuit provisions | TRY 94.3mn | Product and legal obligations affect cash quality. |
Another large line is Reeder Bilişim, accounted for using the equity method. The parent company owns 93.03% of Reeder Bilişim, but states that it does not have management control because of privileges; therefore, the investment is carried by the equity method rather than consolidated. The carrying value is 2.45 billion TL. The 2025 equity-method profit/loss share is 1.26 million TL.
That gap alone does not decide the case. The financial report says the independent valuation firm’s report dated December 31, 2025 found the recoverable amount above book value. But for the investor, the issue is this: the 2.45 billion TL value does not yet appear as cash entering the company or as a large profit engine. When reading the company’s 8.10 billion TL of equity attributable to the parent, one must not forget that this line is valuation-dependent.
Management language runs faster than the financial statements. The 2025 report discusses an M1-class electric car agreement for Reev Aura, a letter of intent with Leaderhub for golf carts, the Magic-EV/Wuxi Shenyun supply process for scooters, the Unisoc T7650 processor for a 5G phone, operating-system talks with Jolla, and artificial intelligence security technologies. Each of these could create value if realized. But today’s financial statements show these projects not yet as profit, but as options.
Management’s past promise must also be placed on the table. Because the 2024 EBITDA commitment in the IPO prospectus was not met, eligible IPO investors received additional Class C shares equal to 50% of the shares they continued to hold. This is a concrete trace showing that the company has stumbled before on an ambitious metric it gave investors. In 2025 there were 504 vehicle orders, 574 units produced, and 518 deliveries; in other words, there are deliveries, but the scale is not yet near the dream.
Ownership and related parties are not footnotes in this story. Uygar Saral owns 24.90% of the capital and 43.90% of the voting rights. In the annual report, the publicly traded portion looks large, but voting power is concentrated in the founder. The financial report includes 356.7 million TL of trade receivables from related parties, a 421.0 million TL short-term prepayment to Reeder İletişim ve Yazılım Hizmetleri, and 632.6 million TL of short-term other payables to Uygar Saral. This does not mean illegality; but for the minority investor it means an obligation to track how capital moves within and around the company.
The company’s collateral, pledge, and mortgage table is also not light. The total TRİ position is 3.04 billion TL. Of this, 2.88 billion TL consists of TRİs given to secure third-party debts for the purpose of conducting ordinary commercial activities; 2.01 billion TL is in favor of the parent shareholder. In such a table, the sentence “debt is low” is not enough on its own. Financial debt may be low; the balance sheet can still carry a network of commitments and relationships.
Valuation must therefore be read in two layers. The first layer is the classic multiple. According to market data dated May 18, 2026, the share price is 7.28 TL and market capitalization is 6.92 billion TL. Financial debt is 350.1 million TL, while cash and financial investments are 95.5 million TL; from this comes an enterprise value of roughly 7.17 billion TL. Against 2025 sales, EV/sales is 4.0x. When depreciation and amortization are added to operating loss, EBITDA is roughly 66.5 million TL; EV/EBITDA is roughly 108x. Because there is a net loss, P/E is not meaningful.
The second layer is book value. Market capitalization is roughly 0.85 times total equity. The bull thesis begins exactly here: “The loss is temporary, the book is cheap, debt is low, the brand and store network are real.” This thesis should be taken seriously. But inside that book are 2.45 billion TL of Reeder Bilişim value, 3.35 billion TL of inventory and advances, 2.38 billion TL of capital adjustment differences, and 2.82 billion TL of share premium. This book is not cash in the safe.
| Valuation question | Calculation | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| P/B | TRY 6.92bn / TRY 8.09bn = 0.85x | Book looks cheap. |
| EV/Sales | TRY 7.17bn / TRY 1.81bn = 4.0x | High for a loss-making revenue base. |
| EV/EBITDA | TRY 7.17bn / TRY 66.5mn = 108x | 2025 earning power does not carry the price. |
| Full Reeder Bilisim + 50% core book | TRY 2.45bn + TRY 2.83bn - TRY 0.25bn = TRY 5.02bn | Below market value. |
| 75% Reeder Bilisim + 35% core book | TRY 1.84bn + TRY 1.98bn - TRY 0.25bn = TRY 3.56bn | More conservative book-quality scenario. |
The company-specific valuation bridge is harsher. If we take Reeder Bilişim at full book value, count the remaining parent-company book at 50% of value, and subtract net debt, the result is roughly 5.02 billion TL. That remains below the 6.92 billion TL market capitalization. A more cautious scenario in which we assign 75% value to Reeder Bilişim and 35% to the remaining book is roughly 3.56 billion TL. This is not a claim of definite value; it is a mirror showing that the market is being quite generous today toward book quality.
The strongest anti-thesis is clear: Reeder is a company with low net financial debt, brand recognition, 108 stores, production infrastructure, and new product options. 2025 may be a transition year. If Reev Aura, scooters, and the 5G phone truly scale, inventory and advances that look bad today may turn into sales tomorrow. If the store network accelerates collections, marketing expense falls relative to sales, and Reeder Bilişim’s value is confirmed through a transaction or cash profit, 0.85x P/B may look cheap.
My objection is not to that possibility, but to the order of proof embedded in today’s price. The market is valuing not a manufacturer that has left losses behind, but a company that must exit losses, turn its inventory, and manage its related-party and commitment network plainly, at 6.92 billion TL. This valuation does not ask 2026 to go well; it requires 2026 to prove the story.
This stock is for the investor who can place a product dream on top of balance-sheet lines. It is not for the investor who wants to join the phrases “domestic technology” or “electric vehicle” without reading the cash, inventory, and related-party notes.
The data that would change my judgment is clear: in 2026, revenue rising while inventories and advances convert into sales, operating cash flow remaining repeatedly positive, delivered mobility products moving from hundreds into thousands, and related-party balances dissolving rather than growing.
Today’s verdict: Expensive.
To become a partner in Reeder today is to buy in advance not the production hope built inside an old tobacco hangar, but the still-unproven conversion of that hope into cash.