Türk Altın’s story begins in Bergama, İzmir, around the Ovacık mine. The company’s name became Eurogold, then Normandy, then Koza; since November 6, 2025, it has been Türk Altın İşletmeleri. But in the first quarter of 2026, the investor must look first not at the mine gate, but at the cashbox standing in front of it.
Because the bare truth of this quarter is this: the company produced less gold and made far more money. Total gold production fell from 46.4 thousand ounces in Q1 2025 to 39.9 thousand ounces in Q1 2026. Over the same period, the average gold sales price per ounce rose from TL 98,996 to TL 214,078. Cash cost per ounce barely moved: from TL 113,268 to TL 113,639. The mine’s voice softened; the price spread shouted.
The Spread Carrying the Vein
Türk Altın’s Q1 2026 revenue was TL 8.883bn; a year earlier it was TL 5.523bn. Cost of sales barely changed: from TL 3.948bn to TL 3.952bn. That is why gross profit rose from TL 1.575bn to TL 4.931bn, and operating profit jumped from TL 526m to TL 3.799bn.
This is not a volume story. Gold sold declined from 40,979 ounces to 39,891 ounces. What lifted revenue was the TL gold price and the surge in the dollar gold price per ounce. The Q1 activity report says plainly that the company does not use hedging; in good weather, all the wind comes in, and in bad weather the door remains just as open.
The business model is simple but delicate: Çukuralan ore is carried to the Ovacık plant, Kaymaz works with stockpiles, main production at Himmetdede has been completed but pouring continues from the existing heap, and plant operations at Mastra were terminated as of 2024. The future is tied to the permitting, engineering, and production timetable of projects such as Mollakara, Karapınar, and Kaşköy. Today’s profitability comes through the gold price; tomorrow’s volume passes through licenses, EIA, and discipline in the field.
As of December 31, 2025, the company reports 2.886m ounces of proven and probable reserves, 3.985m ounces of measured and indicated resources, and 5.755m ounces of inferred resources. That is a solid ore base. But ore sitting in a ledger does not receive full value in the stock; it demands permits, plants, roads, cost, environment, courts, and time.
The Cashbox Is the Second Mine
On the March 31, 2026 balance sheet, there is TL 9.047bn in cash and cash equivalents and TL 15.079bn in short-term financial investments. The Q1 activity report gives the period-end cash position made up of these two items as TL 24.126bn; compared with December 31, 2025, that is an increase of TL 3.652bn, or 17.8%. When long-term financial investments are also added and financial debt is deducted, the net liquid position is approximately TL 28.37bn.
That is why reading TRALT only through the income statement is incomplete. Q1 net profit was TL 1.609bn; but income from investing activities was TL 1.617bn, the TAS 29 net monetary position loss was TL 2.317bn, and tax expense was TL 1.491bn. Net profit is written somewhere between the mine’s production power, the financial yield of the cashbox, and the shadow of inflation accounting.
Cash flow speaks more sharply. Cash flow from operating activities was TL 9.388bn. That is far above net profit. But writing all that cash to the gold sales machine would also be too romantic: working capital movements contributed TL 4.847bn; the decline in inventories and the increase in trade payables helped cash.
| Approach | Calculation | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Market value | TRY 46.60 price x 3.2025bn shares = TRY 149.24bn | The market prices the company as a profitable mine plus cash, not as a high-growth premium story. |
| Net liquid position | TRY 9.05bn cash + TRY 19.34bn financial investments - TRY 0.01bn financial debt = TRY 28.37bn | About 19% of market value is backed by liquid assets. |
| EV / adjusted EBITDA | TRY 120.87bn EV / TRY 17.10bn annualized Q1 adjusted EBITDA = 7.1x | Not expensive if the gold price holds. |
| Reserve-ounce bridge | TRY 120.87bn EV / 2.886m oz reserve = TRY 41,880/oz | That equals 19.6% of Q1 average realized sales price. |
| Net-income multiple warning | TRY 149.24bn / TRY 6.44bn annualized Q1 net income = 23.2x | Net income alone is a weak compass because of monetary loss and tax lines. |
What the Market Is Buying
With market data from May 18, 2026, the share price is TL 46.60 and the market capitalization is TL 149.24bn. Paid-in capital is 3.2025bn shares; the number confirms the market value. Equity attributable to the parent is TL 48.67bn, meaning the stock trades at roughly 3.1x book value. This is not book-value cheapness.
But in mining, book value is not always the right compass. Property, plant and equipment is TL 23.44bn, reserves are 2.886m ounces, and cash and financial investments are high. Once the net liquid position is deducted, enterprise value is approximately TL 120.87bn. The company’s adjusted Q1 EBITDA in the Q1 activity report is TL 4.274bn; annualized, that becomes TL 17.10bn. That implies roughly 7.1x EV/adjusted EBITDA.
The second bridge comes from reserves. When the TL 120.87bn enterprise value is divided by 2.886m ounces of proven and probable reserves, the result is TL 41,880/ounce. That figure is only 19.6% of the Q1 average sales price. Of course, a reserve ounce is not a sales ounce; between them lie production cost, capex, tax, rehabilitation, permitting risk, and time. Still, this ratio shows that the market is carrying the reserve not with a drunken gold price, but with a cautious discount.
So the verdict is clear without shouting: TRALT is not expensive. In fact, on the surface of the current resource base, it is cheap. The cheapness does not come from assuming “the gold price stays here forever”; it comes from the remaining enterprise value, after removing the cash cushion, not looking excessively swollen against Q1 cash generation and the reserve base.
The Court Corridor
Cheapness is not the absence of risk. There are three doors at Türk Altın that can damage capital.
The first is the price door. The Q1 activity report says the most important operational risk is the gold price. The company states that it does not use derivative protection against a fall in the gold price. In Q1, the price-cost spread was TL 100,439/ounce. If that spread compresses below TL 60,000/ounce, today’s valuation language changes.
The second is the permitting door. At Çukuralan, lawsuits continue seeking the annulment of the EIA positive decision for the crushing and screening plant with 500,000 tons/year capacity; although the request for a stay of execution was rejected, the files have not been decided. There are also lawsuits in different courts against the EIA positive decision for the Çanakkale Gold-Silver Mine. Karapınar and Kaşköy reserves look attractive; turning them into production depends on the legal and technical timetable.
The third is the old Koza file. The report includes control and liquidation processes over Koza Ltd., liability lawsuits filed against former executives, and the continuing case before the Ankara 24th High Criminal Court. These may not halt daily gold production; but they place a permanent governance and legal legacy discount on the stock.
| Risk | Sourced datapoint | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Gold price | Q1 2026 sales price TRY 214,078/oz; cash cost TRY 113,639/oz; no hedge | Profit thins quickly if the price spread closes. |
| Production and reserve conversion | Production fell from 46.4k oz to 39.9k oz; proven and probable reserves were 2.886m oz | Reserve value remains optional unless converted into permitted production. |
| Permits and litigation | EIA lawsuits continue for the Çukuralan 500k ton/year facility and the Çanakkale Gold-Silver Mine | Growth projects can remain discounted if legal timing slips. |
| Governance and old Koza file | Koza Ltd. control/liquidation cases, former-manager liability cases and Ankara 24th Heavy Criminal Court proceedings continue | The stock carries legal legacy risk as well as mining risk. |
| Capital allocation | After the period, 13 Group IV exploration licenses were acquired for TRY 482.7m; registered capital ceiling is planned to rise to TRY 10bn | The vault can create value; poor spending would create a discount. |
The Road Up
The hero of the upside scenario is not the gold price alone. If the gold price remains high while Çukuralan production continues, resource development around Kaymaz and Ovacık proceeds, field installation and open-pit activities at Mollakara move closer to production, and the permitting processes at Kaşköy and Karapınar become clearer, the market may reduce the discount it applies to each reserve ounce.
The cashbox is option value here. After the period, the company acquired 13 Group IV exploration licenses for TL 482.7m. If moves like this are made in the right field, at the right cost, and on the right timetable, cash turns into real mine life. If the same cashbox flows into poor projects, weak discipline, or unclear capital decisions, the cheapness argument weakens quickly.
The Counter-Thesis
The strongest counter-thesis is this: Q1 was an excessively good gold price quarter. Showing the stock as cheap on annualized Q1 EBITDA while production is falling may mean buying the top of the cycle. The net profit multiple is around 23x; the price-to-book multiple is above 3x. Mastra is finished, Himmetdede is pouring from a depleted heap, and Kaymaz is running on stockpiles. New production requires a permitting and investment timetable.
This counter-thesis deserves respect. That is why TRALT is not a “sleep easy” stock. It is not suitable for an investor who will not follow the gold screen, the EIA files, and where the cash goes. But the counter-thesis also does not prove that today’s market value prices the cashbox and reserve base at an excessive premium.
Verdict
My verdict for TRALT: cheap. This is not blind gold optimism; it is the combined result of the price-cost spread, net liquid position, reserve base, and an enterprise value/adjusted EBITDA bridge around 7.1x.
The data that would break the thesis is very concrete: a sharp narrowing of the per-ounce spread for two quarters, adverse decisions on the EIA/permitting line that delay growth, or the cashbox flowing into unclear areas instead of production life and stakeholder return. Unless these three arrive, the market today is not buying the cashbox in front of Ovacık and the option beneath the ground too expensively.
Owning this stock means guarding the cashbox as much as owning the gold mine: as long as the price spread stays open, the cashbox speaks; if the spread closes or the license road is blocked, the silence of the mine becomes more expensive.